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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of real estate brokers slowly evolved over the last hun-
dred years, but recently experienced an upheaval.' The longstanding
practice of brokers theoretically representing sellers while actively
dealing with buyers was the catalyst for this upheaval.2 Encouraged
by the National Association of Realtors ("NAR") and local broker orga-
nizations, many state legislatures enacted statutes requiring written
disclosure of the broker-client relationship.3 Some states now recog-
1. Real estate brokerage began in the United States in the nineteenth century
with the westward expansion and population of the western states. D. BARLow BURKE,
JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS, § 1.1 at 1:1 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Burke]. Syn-
dicates started to purchase large tracts of land from the government for later sale. Id.
There was little organization in this practice early on, with most agents engaging in the
practice as a part-time job. Id. Some individuals formed land development companies
whose members included homesteaders, speculators and other investors from the east-
ern states and foreign countries. Id. at 1:2. Yet others served as land locators for set-
tlers moving west. Id. Because the maximum holdings allotted to each homesteader by
the homestead laws were often too small for efficient farming, early land brokers also
had a market in resales of relinquished and abandoned properties. Id.
The real estate broker as a specialist is a more recent phenomenon, originating
since the latter portion of the nineteenth century. Id. at 1:3. Real estate firms arose
during the turn of the century, and the first state licensure laws came after World War
I. Id. Since then, real estate brokers have steadily become more common, creating for
themselves a livelihood in the practice of putting buyers and sellers in contact with each
other. Id. Services have expanded to include property management, inspection, and
investment counseling. Id. In the 1980s, over three million existing dwellings were sold
each year, and one half to three quarters of a million additional new dwellings were sold
per year. Id. at 1:3-4. With most commissions based on the steadily appreciating price
of homes, the brokerage industry has been able to stay ahead of inflation. Id. at 1:4.
The numbers peaked in the late 1980s, with National Association of Realtors ("NAR")
membership at 810,000. Id. Today, there are over 100,000 real estate firms with about
125,000 offices. Id. at 1:5. These firms are usually small, closely held corporations. Id.
Some firms such as Coldwell Banker, a division of Sears, Roebuck & Company; Century
21, owned by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; and ReMax are examples of
franchised mega firms. Id. § 1.2 at 1:8. Most firms are affiliated with the 50 statewide
boards of realtors and the 1,760 local boards and most participate in Multiple Listing
Services ("MLS"). Id. § 1.1 at 1:5. These transactions listed on the MLS account for an
estimated 80 to 90 percent of broker sales. Id. at 1:6.
2. See generally, Michael K Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Es-
tate Brokerage Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 271, 282 (1992) (dis-
cussing the confusion created by traditional real estate agency and reviewing the state
of the law prior to the recent enactment of disclosure laws); Matthew M. Collette, Sub-
Agency In Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle with Real-
ity, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1988) (discussing the problems created by listings and sell-
ing broker subagency, and recommending a form of subagency with limited fiduciary
duties, noting that changes to the traditional approach could create new problems).
3. One hundred twenty brokers founded the NAR in Chicago, Illinois in 1908.
BURKE, supra note 1, § 1.3 at 1:11. It is recognized as the trade association representing
the real estate brokerage industry. NAR membership approximates one third of all li-
censed brokers and salespersons. Id. The NAR adopted standards for the industry in
1971. Id. at 1:14. The standards govern industry practices, brokers' professional con-
duct, and their use of MLS systems. Id. Members who comply with the standards are
entitled to use the copyrighted trademark "realtor," NAR-sponsored errors and omis-
sions insurance, and NAR litigation support. Id.
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nize the concept of buyers' brokers. Other states condone a dual
agency relationship where the broker simultaneously enters into an
agency relationship with both the buyer and seller in the same trans-
action. Despite new statutes which require disclosure and define the
brokers' permissible relationships and duties, in most instances, state
legislatures left the common law of agency in effect.
Common law agency imposes a greater fiduciary duty on brokers
than current statutory law. This was forcefully brought to the atten-
tion of brokers by two Minnesota cases involving Edina Realty Corpo-
ration ("Edina Realty"), the fourth largest real estate brokerage firm
in the United States.4 Despite Edina Realty's compliance with Minne-
sota's agency disclosure laws, the court found that Edina Realty
breached the more stringent common law fiduciary duty.6 At issue
were damages approximatng $210 million in commissions Edina Re-
alty earned between 1986 and 1992.6 Although ultimately settled for
a mere $19.9 million, the Edina Realty litigation caused an uproar
among brokers who, as a consequence of the litigation, were as uncer-
tain as ever on how to proceed without liability.7
During its 1993 annual convention, NAR reacted by requesting
state legislatures to enact "statutory agency" in order to preempt com-
mon law agency.8 The NAR proposal addressed the following issues:
4. See Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. June 17, 1993) (holding defendant's failure to furnish full disclosure of dual agency
is a breach of fiduciary duty); Bokusky v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993
WL 515827 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1993) (granting plaintiff class certification motion regard-
ing sufficiency of defendant's dual agency disclosure forum); see infra notes 73-133 and
accompanying text.
5. Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
1993); Bokusky v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D. Minn.
1993).
6. Neal Gendler, Dual-Agency Suits Against Edina Settled: Real Estate Firm Ad-
mits No Wrongdoing in Multimillion-Dollar State, U.S. Action, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRm-
uNE, Feb. 2, 1995, at 3D [hereinafter Gendler].
7. Scott Carlson, Plaintiffs Win Cash in Agency Case, Cm. TaM., Feb. 12, 1995, at
7V. The settlements included an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs' lawyers of
approximately $4.4 million. See Gendler, supra note 6, at 3D.
See Willard Woods, Burnet Realty Inc. Lists Change in Policy: Agents From Other
Brokers Can't Represent Burnet Sellers, Move Formally Ends Firm's Participation In
Decades-Old System, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, May 8, 1993 at ID (discussing one
large Minnesota real estate firm's reaction to the Edina Realty decisions). The firm
decided to discontinue offering sub-agency to outside selling brokers; instead, the firm
will be the only agent of the seller in its listings, and will deal only with buyer's brokers.
Id. This approach resembles the proposal discussed in Part VII.A. See infra notes 293-
98 and accompanying text for a discussion of realistic solutions. See also Willard
Woods, Ruling May Cost Edina Realty Millions: 30,000 Sellers Could Get Refunds, MIN.
NEAPOLIS STAR TRmUNE, June 23, 1993, at 1A (discussing broker reactions to the Edina
decisions).
8. See Terry Sheridan, Realtors To Be Advised: Represent Someone, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Oct. 31, 1993, at IG [hereinafter Sheridan] (quoting Sharon Millett, vice chairman
of the facilitator advisory group of NAR, who explained:
[Vol. 29
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1) protecting the consumer from liability for the acts of agents; 2) de-
lineating the duties owed by brokers to their clients when acting as
buyer's brokers, seller's brokers, dual agents, and limited agents; 3)
determining an agent's obligations when the relationship ends; 4) de-
termining what property conditions must be disclosed; 5) clarifying a
real estate agency relationship versus other agency relationships, in-
cluding the creation of a presumption of limited agency unless the par-
ties bargain for more; and 6) recommending that new legislation
dealing with real estate agency supersede all previous case. law.9 In
1992, NAR announced that it would drop its requirement that selling
agents using Multiple Listing Services ("MLS") become subagents of
the seller. This change lessened the incidence of dual agency and al-
lowed the emerging trend of buyer's agents to grow.10
Many brokers have further demanded freedom to practice as
"facilitators," also known as independent contractors or transaction
brokers. In this capacity, brokers represent the deal and not the par-
ties, thereby avoiding fiduciary duties to either the buyer or the seller.
NAR has not endorsed the "facilitator" concept.1 1 Despite NAR's
resistance, however, some states have provided for facilitator status in
their new statutes. 12 Notably, it does not seem that facilitators lower
their commissions even though brokers acting only as facilitators re-
lieve themselves of a major source of potential liability. The support-
ers of this approach argue that the use of facilitators will reduce
litigation. Furthermore, proponents argue that new statutes requir-
ing full written disclosure of broker relationships, permitting in-
dependent contractor status, and allowing avoidance of common law
What we are trying to say is that (who and how an agent represents) seems to
be very important to consumers and integral to the industry, and if liability
concerns have been encouraging the move away from agency (toward
faciitators.and other nonagents), then maybe the better solution is to clarify
what the agent's duties are).
See also H. Jane Lehman, Association to Redefine Agent Roles, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
20, 1993, at el [hereinafter Lehman] (reporting on the outcome of NAR's 1993 annual
meeting, and interviewing Laurene K Janik, general counsel for NAR, who stated that
"'statutory agency' [is] a means of codifying the common law duties that apply to real
estate agents and eliminating the irrelevant").
9. Sheridan, supra note 8, at 1G.
10. See Steve Kerch & T.J. Howard, Changing the Rules, Realtors' Move May Make
Using Buyer Brokers Easier, Cm. Tam., Jan. 10, 1993, at 1 Real Estate.
11. See Judy Stark, A Scorecard on Agents: Whose Side Are They On?, ST. PETERS-
BURG Turms, Nov. 21, 1993, at 3 At Home (discussing NAR's decision not to endorse the
facilitator concept, referring to an NAR survey of home sellers which found that 76 per-
cent felt "it was very important that their agent represent them exclusively; [60] per-
cent of buyers said it was very important that the agent owe fiduciary dut[ies] to them").
12. See infra notes 138-280 and accompanying text for a discussion of state legisla-
tion defining permissible relationships and mandating disclosure.
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agency will better serve consumers. 13 However, the facilitator ap-
proach creates new problems and does not completely solve the cur-
rent ones. 
14
First, many of the new disclosure laws require brokers to define
and explain to their clients the legal relationship into which they are
entering. Giving this type of advice requires a trained lawyer. Per-
formed by a broker, these disclosure explanations would probably con-
stitute an unauthorized practice of law. If the broker provides
disclosure information in written form only, consumer confusion will
occur regarding the distinction, between a facilitator, agent, or dual
agent. Few consumers would heed a broker's warning to seek advice
from a lawyer before entering the relationship.
Second, conflicts of interest occur when the brokers must explain
their limited responsibility under facilitator or dual agency represen-
tation while at the same time trying to "land" the client. It is unrealis-
tic to expect that, at the moment a broker is trying to win the business
of a potential customer, the broker will successfully explain the lim-
ited responsibility owed to the client as a dual agent or facilitator.
This is particularly true when the broker is competing for the business
with brokers who are willing to enter into a traditional agency rela-
tionship. Moreover, in today's consumer market, real estate brokers
must provide more service to their clients, not less. If brokers want to
continue commanding their current commission rates and insist that
their calling is a profession, facilitator/independent contractor status
is not the solution.
Third, the current system is impractical in its application. A bro-
ker may have a different relationship with each client. 15 In fact, it is
possible that a broker's relationship with a client may differ depend-
ing on which property is involved. To further complicate matters, the
current system confuses customers about what to expect from their
broker. This confusion leads to unfulfilled expectations and disillu-
sionment, though perhaps unjustified, with the brokerage profession.
Brokers need a simple and consistent set of guidelines in order to
practice their profession safely and prosperously. This article pro-
13. See Lehman, supra note 8, at el (quoting NAR's general counsel, who stated "I
cannot identify any benefit or any rights being taken away by this proposal").
14. See Richard Kindleberger, The Middlemen Get Put in the Middle, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1992, at 37 Real Estate (reporting on reactions to the facilitator con-
cept, including comments by the president of the Massachusetts Association of Buyer
Agents, stating that "at a time when Realtors are trying to increase their professional
stature ... it is a mistake to offer a diminished service that won't give customers the
benefit of the advice, research, confidentiality and advocacy that consumers are entitled
to from buyer and seller agents").
15. See Terry Sheridan, Law to Clarify Real Estate Agents' Roles Muddies the Wa-
ters, THE DAILY BUSINEss REvIEw-BRowARD CoUNTY FLORIDA, April 28, 1995, at A6.
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poses a simple statutory scheme which will eliminate the problems
and satisfy the needs of all the participants in a real estate sale.
Part II of this article discusses the traditional approach to real
estate agency. Part III discusses the major modifications to the tradi-
tional approach; namely, the use of buyer's brokers and the concept of
facilitators/independent contractors in real estate sales. Part IV
surveys some of the more significant cases involving issues of real es-
tate broker agency and disclosure, particularly in the context of dual
agency situations. Part V surveys the reactions by NAR and state leg-
islatures that have resulted in various new statutes defining the per-
missible brokerage relationships and prescribing disclosure. Part VI
analyzes the various legislative approaches and identifies several
problems the approaches have in common. Part VII discusses the pro-
posed solution. The Appendices include a table comparing the stat-
utes' features and examples of the new disclosure forms.
II. TRADITIONAL REAL ESTATE AGENCY - BROKERS
REPRESENT THE SELLER
A. LISTING BROKER AS AGENT OF THE SELLER; SELLING BROKER
SUBAGENCY
The traditional real estate brokerage practice consists of a broker
undertaking representation of a seller of real property. The seller-bro-
ker relationship is one of principal and agent. 16 "Agency" is defined as
a "fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."17 Whether
an agency relationship exists "is a question of fact, unless the facts can
be interpreted in only one way."1 8 An agency relationship may be cre-
ated by oral or written contract or by conduct. 19 The agency relation-
ship between the broker and the seller is easy to identify, because it is
expressly created through the execution of a listing agreement which
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(2) (1957) (defining "principal" as "the
one for whom action is to be taken"). The Restatements define '[algent" as "[tihe one
who is to act." Id. § 1(3). See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, ch. 2 (1993)
[hereinafter Lefcoe].
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1957).
18. Joseph M. Grohman, A Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker's Agency
Relationship with the Purchaser, 61 ST. JomN's L. REv. 560, 567 (1987) (citing Thayer v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 360 P.2d 56, 62, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 826 (1961); Brokaw v. Black-
Foxe Military Inst., 231 P.2d 816, 818 (Cal. 1951)).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) cmt. b (1957); see Sandra Nelson, The
Illinois Real Estate "Designated Agency Amendment": A Minefield for Brokers, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 953, 958 n.34 (1994) (discussing the creation of an agency relation-
ship); HAROLD G. REuscHnBIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY & PARTNERSHip, at § 12 (2d ed. 1990).
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usually authorizes the broker to act as the seller's exclusive agent.20
The broker is the seller's agent, and the broker owes the seller the
fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty, reasonable care and dili-
gence, disclosure, and accounting. 21 A broker who breaches the fiduci-
20. Lefcoe, supra n.16, at 28-30 (explaining the types of listing arrangements).
21. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 845 (1976) (defining fiduci-
ary relation as "the relation existing where one person justifiably reposes confidence,
faith, and reliance in another whose aid, advice, or protection is sought in some mat-
ter"). See BuRm, supra note 1, § 7.2 at 7:2. These duties are often mentioned but sel-
dom defined. Id. The duty of good faith and loyalty is usually understood to mean that
unless the principal agrees otherwise, an agent must act exclusively for the benefit of
the principal in all matters connected with the agency. RESTATEENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 387 (1957). See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). In Meinhard,
Judge Cardozo defined loyalty as "[niot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive." Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
The Florida Real Estate Commission, in its Handbook, explains the duty in simpler
and more conventional terms:
Loyalty of the agent is a must. A broker must always place the interests of the
principal above the interests of anyone else. The fiduciary relationship pre-
vents a broker from revealing any information that may harm the principal.
For example, a broker may not reveal such information such as the principal's
financial condition, the fact that the principal will accept a lower price than the
listing price for the property, or any similar facts that may damage or alter the
principal's financial bargaining position.... The duty of loyalty also requires
the broker to obtain the most favorable price and terms for the principal...
[and] cannot withhold information from the principal .... [I]f the broker learns
any harmful information about the principal, the broker cannot disclose or
otherwise use such information - even after the transaction is completed and
the fiduciary relationship is dissolved. While the fiduciary relationship gener-
ally ends when the broker and principal have fulfilled their duties to one an-
other, the broker's obligation to keep information confidential remains.
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMUSSION HANDBOOK, Ch. 2 § 2(a)(4) at 2-16-17 (1993). RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1957) (defining the duty of reasonable care
and diligence as "to act with standard care and with the skill which is standard in the
locality for the kind of work which [the agent] is employed to perform and, in addition,
to exercise any special skill that [the agent] has"). See also MICHAEL L. CLOSEN & GARY
S. ROSIN, AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP, 137 (1992); FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION HAND-
BOOK, Ch. 2 § 2(a)(4) at 2-14 (1993). The FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COhMUSSION HANDBOOK
states in relevant part:
As professionals, brokers must maintain a standard of care that requires,
among other things, they understand matters concerning the land, title, and
physical characteristics of the property they have listed. They need not be at-
torneys, but to qualify for state licenses, brokers must know and understand
the real estate license law. Brokers should also know and be able to explain to
clients in simple terms the practical effects of common financing terms, contin-
gency clauses, restrictions and limitations, and routine contract provisions. A
broker, therefore, should use reasonable care in the following: 1) [d]etermining
a listing price and advising the client as to a reasonable offer; 2) [u]ncovering
material facts and informing the client of these facts; 3) [l]earning all the facts
relevant to the sale, such as whether any physical defects exist; 4) [plreparing
and explaining key portions of listing and sales contracts as well as any other
legal documents related to the transaction; 5) [s]uggesting the seller seek other
expert advice when appropriate; 6) [aldhering to deadlines [and] closing dates;
and 7) [m]aking a reasonable effort to fulfill the obligations of the employment
contract; this includes holding open houses, advertising, and listing in multiple
listing service ....
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ary duty of loyalty forfeits his commission.22 Unless bad faith is
shown, a broker who breaches duties other than the duty of loyalty is
liable only for the damages the broker causes. These damages may be
less than the broker's commission.23
After executing the listing agreement, the seller's property is
placed on the broker's list of properties available for sale. In most in-
stances, the broker will also register the seller's property with the lo-
cal multiple listing service ("MLS"), thereby providing other brokers
with easy access to information about the seller's property. The seller,
by placing the property on a broker's list and gaining access to the
MLS, hopes to obtain wider exposure and advertising than the seller
would through a newspaper advertisement or by placing a "For Sale
By Owner" sign outside the property. Through the MLS, the seller
hopes to benefit from the salesmanship of not only the listing broker,
but also other brokers participating in the MLS. This should translate
into a faster sale at the best possible price. By employing a broker, the
seller also hopes to receive the services of an expert in the sales trans-
action process who will shepherd the parties to closing. This aspect of
a broker's service is extremely helpful to sellers who are unfamiliar
with sale transaction requirements.
The duty of disclosure is often combined with the duty of loyalty in the context of
real estate agency. If the client is the seller, this duty includes disclosure of all offers,
reasonable and unreasonable. If the client is the buyer, this duty includes presenting
all offers and disclosing all material facts. These material facts include facts relating to
the condition of the property, the terms of the transaction, and now, the type of agency
relationships available and chosen. Section 381 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
states:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts
to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him
and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and
which can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1957). The duty of accounting, in the specific
context of real estate agency, usually relates to statutes and regulations concerning bro-
ker receipt of deposits and management of escrow accounts. The Florida Real Estate
Commission explains:
The broker must be able to report the status of any and all funds entrusted to
him/her by the principal or by a prospective buyer.... Commingling of monies
received by a broker into a personal account, a form of conversion, is illegal and
grounds for license suspension.... In all transactions, a broker is required to
see that the principal receives a final accounting and any intermediate account-
ings as agreed upon or reasonably demanded by the principal. In an ordinary
sale the final accounting is called a closing statement.
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION HANDBOOK, Chap. 2 § 2(a)(4) at 2-17 (1993).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 469 (1957) (stating "an agent is entitled to no
compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of
loyalty").
23. BuRKE, supra note 1, § 7:6 at 7:53 (applying tort-style actual damages where
broker breached duty other than loyalty and acted negligently instead of in bad faith)
(citing Veach v. Meyeres Real Estate, Inc., 599 P.2d 746, 749 (Alaska 1979)).
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In exchange for these services, the seller agrees to pay the broker
a commission based on a percentage of the actual sales price obtained
for the property. The seller also authorizes the broker to procure po-
tential purchasers, cooperate with other brokers through the MLS,
show the property, and act as the seller's representative in the negoti-
ations. This process screens out buyers who are not qualified or seri-
ous about purchasing. When the listing broker, either alone or
through the cooperation of another broker participating in the MLS,
produces a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the
seller's property, the listing broker becomes entitled to the
commission. 24
Those brokers who do not have a direct relationship with the
seller based on a written agreement are called selling brokers. Selling
brokers earn a commission by selling, not listing, the seller's property.
In the usual case involving a selling broker who is not the listing bro-
ker, the listing broker agrees to share the commission with the selling
broker. These selling brokers who market the seller's property
through access to the MLS are deemed subagents of the seller under
the traditional approach.25 The subagency approach makes collecting
a share of the commission easier for the selling broker and usually
leads to greater cooperation with the seller and the listing agent.26
In order to market the seller's property, either the listing broker
or the MLS-participating selling broker must deal actively with both
the seller and the buyer. The buyer often perceives, because of the
broker's friendly and helpful salesmanship, that the broker is working
for the buyer, or at least on the buyer's behalf. Under the traditional
approach, the buyer is unrepresented unless the buyer expressly con-
tracts with a broker for representation. The traditional approach rec-
ognizes that the broker's legal relationship and loyalties are to the
seller. Additionally, if the buyer does contract with the listing broker
for representation, the listing broker becomes a dual agent with di-
vided loyalties. 27
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the traditional relationship
between the buyer and the broker is not usually considered an agency
relationship. However, if principles of agency are used to analyze the
24. Bumca, supra note 1, § 3.2 at 3:3.
25. Lefcoe, supra note 16, at 42-44. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 5(1)
(1957) (defining a "subagent" as "a person appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to
perform functions undertaken by the agent for the principal, but for whose conduct the
agent agrees with the principal to be primarily responsible").
26. For example, subagency makes it easier and less risky to use lockboxes for ac-
cess to unoccupied properties listed for sale. See Matthew M. Collette, Sub-Agency In
Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal To End the Struggle With Reality, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 399, 445 (1988).
27. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of dual agency.
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typical interactions between buyers and brokers, an agency relation-
ship arguably does exist.28 Under agency law, the parties may create
an agency relationship by contract or by conduct. Although the buyer
usually does not enter into a written agreement with the broker, an
agency relationship may arise "where one person manifests his inten-
tion that another shall act on his behalf, the other person consents to
such, and the party for whom the other acts has the right to control
the ultimate direction of the cooperative effort."29 If such manifesta-
tions exist, then the consequences of an agency relationship may at-
tach even though neither the principal nor the agent receives
consideration. 30 Thus, analysis of buyer and broker conduct under ob-
jective standards reasonably infers the existence of an agency
relationship.
Buyers typically initiate the relationship with a selling broker
either through a phone call or a visit to the broker's office. The buyer
may inquire about a specific property advertised by the broker or may
seek the broker's assistance in general pursuit of a home purchase.
The buyer usually expresses a desire to have the broker obtain infor-
mation about prospective properties, such as: fair market value, re-
pair needs, homeowners' association, homeowners' association fees
and regulations, property tax and insurance costs, prevailing financ-
ing rates, and assumability of mortgages. Usually, the buyer relies on
the broker to arrange for inspections, title examination, financing, and
closing. This conduct, combined with the conversations that typically
follow, may be reasonably interpreted as the buyer's manifestation of
his intent to have the broker act on his behalf.3 ' When the broker
prequalifies the buyer, shows the buyer properties, submits offers to
28. See Joseph M. Grohman, A Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker's
Agency Relationship with the Purchaser, 61 ST. JoH''s L. REv. 560, 567-70 (1987) (dis-
cussing the necessary elements for establishing an agency relationship, and finding
them to exist in the typical interactions between buyers and brokers).
29. Grohman, 61 ST. JomN's L. lRv. at 567.
30. Id. at 569; see Roy T. Black, Proposed Alternatives to Traditional Real Property
Agency: Restructuring the Brokerage Relationship, 22 REAL EST. L.J. 201, 205 (1994)
(discussing the creation of "accidental agency") (citing Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d
285 (1968); Gray v. Fox, 151 Cal. App. 3d 482 (1984)). It can be argued that both the
buyer and the broker receive consideration through their relationship. The buyer does
pay for the broker's services indirectly, however, by purchasing the property. No broker
earns a commission unless the buyer purchases, and it is from the sales proceeds that
the listing broker receives his commission, which he in turn shares with the selling
broker. Therefore, the broker does receive consideration. Similarly, the buyer receives
consideration in the form of the broker's services and ultimately in finding a satisfactory
property.
31. In fact, state of the art real estate marketing includes brokers visiting the pro-
spective buyer's home and using online services to provide assistance to buyers "on their




sellers, and negotiates on the buyer's behalf, the buyer may reason-
ably interpret the brokers conduct as the broker's manifestation of
consent to act on the buyer's behalf.3 2 In addition, further manifesta-
tions of the broker's consent occur when the broker assists in arrang-
ing financing, property inspections, insurance coverage, title
examination, and closing for the buyer.
The only other requirement for an agency relationship is the prin-
cipal's right to control the agent. The principal may exercise the right
to control before or during the time in which the agent acts; the princi-
pal may even choose not to exercise his right to control.33 All that the
principal must establish is the right to control, not the act of control.34
This right to control requirement is arguably satisfied by the very na-
ture of the relationship: the buyer decides on which properties to
make offers, and the buyer has the final decision regarding the terms
of any offer submitted or counteroffer accepted.3 5 One further indica-
tor of the buyer's right to control is the right to terminate the relation-
ship and seek the services of another broker. Thus, in the typical real
estate transaction, agency law does not support the traditional view
that the buyer and the selling broker have not entered into an agency
relationship. 36
If application of the law of agency arguably indicates that an
agency relationship between the buyer and the broker does exist even
though not supported by contract, then the selling broker would owe
the buyer full fiduciary duties. However, the selling broker's simulta-
neous subagency and attendant fiduciary duties to the seller creates a
dual agency situation. In order to avoid this problem, courts in most
32. Grohman, 61 ST. JoN's L. REV. at 568 (stating that:
no specific words are necessary to find such an acceptance. Where one finds
that the principal communicated to the purported agent his desire that the
.agent act on his behalf and the agent proceeded to act as requested without
communicating to the principal by words or action that he did not intend to act
on the principal's behalf, the principal may reasonably infer from the agent's
performance that he performed on the principal's behalf).
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 cmt. b, illus. 3 (1957)).
33. Id. (citing RESTATEmrENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 cmt. a).
34. Id.
35. If the selling broker is not an agent of the buyer, then the buyer could argue
that he cannot be bound by his offer because the broker had no authority to submit it on
his behalf. However, the buyer is usually bound when a seller accepts the buyer's offer
when submitted by the selling broker. This ability of the selling broker to bind the
buyer is a further indication supporting the existence of an agency relationship.
36. Grohman, 61 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. at 589-90; see Duffy v. Setchel, 347 N.E.2d
218, 219-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that a selling broker was the agent of the buyer,
relying on the following factors: 1) the purchaser initiated the contact with the brbker;
2) the purchaser asked the broker to make an offer to the sellers; 3) the broker had no
prior relationship with the sellers regarding the property; 4) the buyer considered the
broker to be her agent; 5) the broker did in fact submit the buyer's offer to the sellers;
and 6) the broker negotiated the terms of the sale until agreement was reached).
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cases prefer to apply the presumption of a selling broker subagency to
the seller and will not apply the above analysis to infer an agency rela-
tionship between buyers and selling brokers.37 As discussed in Part
II. B. below, NAR and local real estate boards have made this pre-
sumption a requirement for participation in MLS systems. Thus,
under traditional subagency relationships, selling brokers owe pur-
chasers no fiduciary duties. Injured buyers, however, may sue in tort
for negligence or misrepresentation.3 8 The alternative, which would
comport with the parties' expectations and the law of agency, would be
to eliminate the presumption of the selling broker's subagency to the
seller. This alternative was recently implemented and does not create
a presumption of the- selling broker's agency to the buyer..
B. THE MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICES REINFORCE THE TRADITIONAL
APPROACH
A multiple listing service ("MLS") offers brokers in a given locale
the opportunity to pool their listings in order to maximize the expo-
sure of properties for sale.3 9 In exchange for such cooperation, bro-
kers agree to share their commissions. 40 Brokers who are members of
the MLS submit listings with data sheets describing the property to
an appraisal committee. 4 1 The appraisal committee then determines
whether the sales price is reasonable. The MLS compiles the pooled
listings into a book or computer data base. The MLS also provides a
gauge of the current market; brokers are required to notify the service
of sales of listed properties and the price obtained.4 2 Through the in-
creased market exposure to member brokers, the MLS is intended to
produce quicker sales at higher sales prices for vendors.
To participate in the service, brokers must first execute a listing
agreement with the seller/owner of a property.4 3 The usual agree-
ment provides the broker with an exclusive right to sell the property,
making the listing broker the agent of the seller. The listing entitles
37. See Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co., 736 P.2d 391, 400 (Colo. 1987) (en
banc); Kruse v. Miller, 300 P.2d 855, 857-58 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
38. BuRKE, supra note 1, § 8.3 at 8:39.
39. Id. § 1.4 at 1:12.
40. Id. Because access to the service is restricted to member brokers, the service
has been the subject of antitrust litigation, including actions against MLS listing bro-
kers for paying referral fees rather than split commissions when dealing with buyers'
brokers. See Market Force, Inc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 706 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Wis.
1989), aff'd, 906 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1990) (addressing antitrust issues in a real estate
transaction).
41. BuRKE, supra note 1, § 1.4 at 1:13-14.
42. Id.
43. Consumers are not allowed direct access to multiple listing services, and must




the listing broker to a commission when the property is sold or when
any broker produces a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to
purchase. If a broker other than the listing broker uses the MLS and
procures the buyer, that broker is called the selling broker.
Until recently, the MLS rules required members to make an offer
of subagency to the other non-listing brokers when submitting a list-
ing. Procurement of a ready, willing, and able buyer constituted sub-
stantial performance and, thus, acceptance of the listing broker's offer.
The selling broker received consideration from the listing broker in
the form of a share of the listing broker's commission. The selling bro-
ker, therefore, usually became a subagent of the listing broker who, in
turn, was the agent of the seller.
Although the seller was not the principal of the selling broker, the
seller could be held liable for the selling broker's actions. If the seller
was held liable as the principal for wrongful actions by the subagent'
selling broker, the seller had a remedy against the listing broker.
Even though the law of agency allows the listing broker to employ sub-
agents, such as the selling broker in this situation, agency law does
not allow the listing broker to delegate duties that the listing broker
owes the seller.44 Thus, subagency creates additional potential liabil-
ity for the listing broker, who might not be aware of the selling bro-
ker's conduct when dealing with a buyer.
Although the MLS presumption of subagency became the favored
approach, the selling and listing broker could also, legally, be consid-
ered joint venturers, partners, or independent contractors. 45 In addi-
tion, because of the presumption of subagency, the use of the MLS still
left the buyer unrepresented. Since the selling broker is not often the
listing broker, the selling broker tends to have much more contact
with the buyer than with the seller. Arguably, therefore, the MLS
adds to the buyer's misconception that the broker with whom the
buyer is dealing works for the buyer.
Most jurisdictions removed the requirement of an offer of sub-
agency as a condition for participation in the MLS. NAR recom-
mended this change in 1992 and replaced the mandatory offer of
subagency with an elective offer of "cooperation and compensation" to
brokers who assist the listing broker in selling a property.46 This
change seems to be a move away from agency law to contract law,
44. BuRKE, supra note 1, § 1.5 at 1:18.
45. Id. at 1:17.
46. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, HANDBOOK ON MULTIPLE LISTING POLICY
- RESIDENTIAL, at § 1.2 (1993). This new approach could create new problems. A sell-
ing agent who is not a buyer's broker may have trouble collecting a share of the sales
commission paid to the listing broker if the selling broker is no longer automatically a
subagent. Although quantum meruit comes to mind as a possible remedy, litigation
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allowing brokers to create working relationships according to their
own terms.
47
An exception to this rule is usually made for in-house sales -
sub-agency is still mandatory when the listing and selling brokers
work for the same firm. Once the listing broker places the property on
the MLS, this exception automatically applies, regardless of whether
another in-house broker actually uses the MLS. This exception at-
tempts to reduce the incidence of dual agency arising when one firm
represents both sides of one transaction. The removal of the presump-
tion of subagency has allowed the practice of buyer agency to grow and
should also lessen the potential liability of the listing broker for the
acts of selling brokers.
Despite NAR's recommended change, subagency still seems to be
the most common approach used by brokers. NAR's main purpose be-
hind the new approach apparently was to recognize buyer's brokers.
However, because selling broker subagency is still required for in-
house sales, buyers may believe that the selling broker works for
them.
C. MISCONCEPTIONS AMONG CONSUMERS AND PRACTITIONERS
As identified above, the common problem in the traditional real
estate agency relationship occurs when the selling broker acts as the
subagent of the listing broker. As a subagent of the listing broker, the
selling broker works for the seller, not the buyer. However, in typical
transactions, the selling broker deals mostly with the buyer, showing
properties and probably discussing things that the buyer assumes the
broker will not reveal to the seller. The selling broker often has con-
tact with the seller only when showing the seller's property or submit-
ting offers. Because of the selling agent's subagency to the listing
broker, the selling agent is legally obligated to work in the seller's best
interests, which would require the disclosure of the discussions with
the buyer. The actual legal relationship between the parties is the
opposite of what the buyer believes. Furthermore, this relationship
makes the listing broker liable for the actions of the selling broker
with respect to both the buyer and the seller.
If, as now permitted under the new MLS rules, the selling broker
is the agent of the buyer, then the selling broker would owe the buyer
fiduciary duties such as loyalty, disclosure, and diligence. Because of
may be necessary for selling brokers to protect themselves with contracts spelling out
the terms of "cooperation and compensation."
47. See Black, 22 REAL EST. L.J. 201 (1994) (discussing confusion caused by re-




this, the selling broker must disclose to the buyer any knowledge of
adverse facts the selling broker acquires from the listing broker or the
seller.48 Even if not disclosed, the information would be imputed to
the buyer, resulting in the buyer losing causes of action such as rescis-
sion and restitution against the seller.
The problems increase when the broker acts as a dual agent.
Dual agency is the situation that arises when a broker represents both
the buyer and the seller in one transaction. 49 A dual agency can arise
when a buyer's broker shows a buyer one of the broker's own listings,
when a listing broker contracts to represent the buyer as well as the
seller in the same transaction, and in transactions involving a listing
broker and a buyer's broker who work for the same firm.5° Dual
agency does not usually arise until at least one party in a transaction
contracts for representation. The law permits dual agency, provided
the broker discloses his or her dual representation to all parties in the
transaction and the parties consent in writing. Failing to disclose and
obtain consent may have dire consequences, including loss of the bro-
ker's commission and even avoidance of the sale.51
48. Most states already impose a duty on brokers to inspect the seller's property
and disclose facts relating to the condition of the seller's property, such as whether the
property is "psychologically impacted" from past incidents such as murders. This duty
is imposed regardless of whether or not the broker has an agency relationship with the
buyer, and represents a departure from the traditional rule of caveat emptor. See, e.g.,
Constance Frisby Fain, An Overview of Real Estate Agent or Broker Liability, 23 REAL
EST. L.J. 257 (1995) (discussing cases where brokers have been held liable for failing to
disclose to purchasers facts relating to the condition of the seller's property); Note, Im-
posing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective Housing, 99 HARv. L. REV.
1861 (1986) (advocating a system of broker liability in instances involving defective
housing sales). In some states, this duty has been codified. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2079.3 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring disclosure of all material facts affecting the value
of the property which a reasonable visual inspection would reveal).
49. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides: "Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to a duty to his principal not to act on behalf of an adverse party in a
transaction connected with his agency without the principal's knowledge." RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1957).
50. One other dual agency situation which is seldom discussed is that which arises
when a broker represents more than one potential purchaser at the same time with
regard to one property. See BuRKE, supra note 1, § 7.5.1 at 7:38-39 (citing Stefani v.
Baird & Warner, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that, when a bro-
ker acts as a the agent of one buyer, if he arranges a sale to another buyer for a higher
price, his undisclosed dual representation is a breach of fiduciary duty)), This problem
does not arise with multiple representation of sellers because each of the sellers' proper-
ties is unique. Therefore there are distinguishable reasons beyond the broker's control
that account for one seller's property being sold more quickly.
51. See Taborsky v. Mathews, 121 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (hold-
ing that because the real estate broker failed to disclose his dual agency, the buyers
were entitled to avoid the sale and purchase money mortgage which was being fore-
closed in the action). The court stated:
In our jurisprudence it is well established that an agent for one party to a
transaction cannot act for the other party without the consent of both princi-
pals. Where an agent assumes to act in such a dual capacity without such
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Brokers often inserted into the fine print of their listing agree-
ments a clause permitting dual agency. By doing so, a broker could
obtain a seller's signature on a listing agreement by claiming that he
represented the seller. At the time the listing agreement was exe-
cuted, the broker would indeed only represent the seller and would
probably possess confidential information about the seller and the
property. The broker mfxy already be representing potential buyers,
having executed agreements with them which also permit dual
agency. The broker would probably also possess confidential informa-
tion about these potential buyers. Dual agency would still not exist,
because, even though the broker represents buyers and sellers, the
broker is not representing buyers and sellers in the same transaction.
However, once the broker brings the parties together by showing the
seller's property to the buyer, dual agency exists. At this point, the
broker possesses confidential information about both parties and
could also receive payment from both parties. In a dual agency situa-
tion, the broker cannot disclose to either party the confidential infor-
mation the broker possesses. If the broker maintains these
confidences, the broker does not have complete loyalty to either party.
More likely, however, the broker discloses whatever the broker
can get away with in order to close the sale. Even if the broker does
not disclose the information the broker possesses, he or she is faced
with the inherent, and arguably unconsentable, conflict of interest of
trying to obtain the best price for both parties.52 The buyer expects to
obtain the lowest possible price, while the seller expects to obtain the
highest possible price. Clearly, this is not possible, and this is why
assent, the transaction is voidable as a matter of public policy ... . 'No princi-
ple is better settled than that a man cannot be the agent of both the seller and
the buyer in the same transaction, without the intelligent consent of both. Loy-
alty to his trust is the most important duty which the agent owes to his princi-
pal. Reliance upon his integrity, fidelity, and ability is the main consideration
in the selection of agents; and so careful is the law in guarding his fiduciary
relation that it will not allow an agent to act for himself and his principal, nor
to act for two principals on opposite sides in the same transaction. In such
cases the amount of consideration, the absence of undue advantage, and other
like features are wholly immaterial. Nothing will defeat the principal's right of
remedy, except his own confirmation, after full knowledge of all the facts. Ac-
tual injury is not the principle upon which the law holds such transactions
voidable. The chief object of the principle is not to compel restitution where
actual fraud has been committed, or unjust advantage gained, but it is to pre-
vent the agent from putting himself in a position in which to be honest must be
a strain on him, and to elevate him to a position where he cannot be tempted to
betray his principal.'
Taborsky, 121 So. 2d at 62.
52. See Gene Austin, Dual Agency Controversy Grows, Cm. Thm., Sept. 12, 1992 at
12 Home Guide; Lew Sichelman, Buyers Need to Be Sure the Realtor isn't a 'Double
Agent,' Cm. Tam., Feb. 6, 1993 at 11 Home Guide.
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dual agency has been called an oxymoron. One party will probably
feel less satisfied than the other.
53
In an attempt to rid themselves of fiduciary duties, brokers avoid
entering into agency relationships and instead act as finders,
facilitators, independent contractors, or transaction brokers.54 By act-
ing in these capacities, brokers merely bring the parties together but
do not participate in negotiations and are not considered agents of
either party.
III. MODIFICATIONS TO THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
A. BuYERS' BROKERS
The trend of representing buyers began primarily on the west
coast in the mid-1980's when states enacted the first agency disclosure
laws making the practice viable. The practice was already common in
the commercial real estate setting with large businesses hiring bro-
kers to find suitable properties and brokers seeking to maximize their
business volume by earning commissions from either side of the trans-
action. Buyers' brokerage has expanded from commercial to residen-
tial real estate transactions, with several aggressive brokers offering
representation to buyers.
Statistics show that "[tioday, as many as 50,000 real estate agents
have been trained as home buyers' brokers - about 2,000 represent
buyers exclusively."55 A 1993 survey conducted by NAR revealed that
thirty percent of buyers used a buyers' broker. 56 In addition, many
large firms have become involved in buyers' brokerage. One such firm,
Buyer No. 1, in Austin, Texas, claimed in 1993 to have represented
buyers in over 300 transactions since 1988.5 7 One Colorado firm,
Buyer's Resource, established a national franchise that represents
only buyers.58 Another example is DeWolfe, New England, which in
1993 became the first real estate firm in New England to represent
buyers. Vowing to put consumers first, Mr. DeWolfe has been called
"DeWolfe in sheep's clothing" by a representative of the Massachu-
53. See generally Joe Catalano, The Homestretch: A Survival Guide to Buyers, Sell-
ers, Owners, Renters and Landlords-A Closer Look-Sellers Say, 'No Fair' Say Some Bro-
kers Pressure Them to Set Low Prices, NEWSDAY, Aug. 31, 1991 at 37 (discussing the
tactic of brokers agreeing to list properties at the seller's price, then negotiating the
seller down to a price for which the property could arguably be sold without the "aid" of
a broker).
54. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
55. Vivian Marino, Buyer-Broker Transactions On Rise Across Nation, Cm. Tam.,
May, 16, 1993 at 2R [hereinafter Marino].
56. See Thomas J. Pryor, Dual Agency Disclosure Issues Unresolved, NEW JERSEY
LAWYER, Mar. 7, 1994, at 35 [hereinafter Pryor].




setts Home Buyer's Club. 59 Even lenders are beginning to get in-
volved. First Portland Mortgage Corporation of Maine reported in
1993 that it has begun offering, not only financing, but also buyer rep-
resentation in real estate transactions. 60 Real estate schools are be-
ginning to offer courses in the area of buyers' brokerage, and those
who take enough of their courses receive the new title of Certified
Buyer Broker.61
Many practitioners accustomed to the traditional approach view
the emerging trend of buyers' brokers as a new "scam." 62 These prac-
titioners point to the risks of liability for undisclosed dual agency aris-
ing from the use of buyers' brokerage as a means of increasing income
by earning commissions from both sides of a deal.63 However, con-
sumer advocates support the practice of buyers' brokerage. Consumer
watchdogs such as Ralph Nader of The Center for the Study of Re-
sponsive Law and Stephen Brobeck of the Consumer Federation of
America spoke out in support of buyers' brokerage as a positive step
toward changing the "cartel that caters to sellers' interests while
slighting the buyer."64 Nader joined forces with other prominent con-
sumer advocates such as Jerilyn Coates, a frequent NAR lecturer, to
recommend that consumers confront brokers with a "loyalty pledge"
expressly stating the broker's fiduciary duties in brokerage agree-
ments. 65 Nader also called for the creation of a national association of
59. Richard Kindleberger, Peril or Profits: DeWolfe Walks Where No Local Realtor
Has Tread, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1993 at Al [hereinafter. Kindleberger].
60. Lew Sichelman, Lender Takes On Role of Buyer's Realty Agent, Cm. Tam., Sept.
25, 1993 at 17 Home Guide. The lender claimed the practice would protect consumers
by eliminating brokers as middlemen who collect kickbacks for referring clients to lend-
ers. Id. Loan officers prequalify their customers so they will not shop beyond their
means. Id. Then, the same loan officers take the customers househunting. Id. The
loan officers are paid a commission just as real estate brokers, and they actively negoti-
ate the deal. Id. This does not seem to be a very prudent move, however, when one
thinks of all the additional liability it could potentially create.
61. See Neal Gendler, Dual Agency in Home Sales: Some Say it Isn't a Problem,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 18, 1995 at 5H.
62. See Terry Sheridan, Buyers Byte Into Multiple Listing Service, THE MiAMI HER-
ALD, June 27, 1993 at 1G (discussing the mostly negative reactions of various Miami
brokers to the practice of buyers' brokering).
63. See Robert J. Bruss, Realty Q & A-Buyers Should Have Own Broker, CHI. TRM.
Apr. 24, 1993 at 18 Home Guide; Kindleberger, supra note 59, at Al.
64. Matt Carroll & Richard Kindleberger, Lots & Blocks, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21,
1993 at A26. See generally, GAIL G. LYONS & DONALD L. HARLAN, BUYER AGENCY: YOUR
COMPETrrrVE EDGE IN REAL ESTATE (1991) (discussing the benefits of buyer agency).
65. The agency contract Nader advocates would include'express promises that the
agent will:
1) Be on your side and negotiate the best possible price and terms for you[;]
2) Never represent both the buyer and the seller (or the landlord and the ten-
ant) in the same transaction[;]
3) Never accept any type of kickback, fee, gift or profit individually from any
mortgage provider, title insurance company ... or other real estate service
provider that is involved in your transaction.
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home buyers to lobby legislators to enact consumer protection real es-
tate laws.66
As discussed previously, MLS rules have been changed through-
out the nation so that these rules usually specify that the selling agent
is not necessarily a subagent of the listing agent. This measure allows
for the existence and operation of buyers' brokers. Selling brokers
must now specify whether they will work with buyers' brokers and
what commission the selling broker will pay. Even if the seller is the
actual source of the commission, buyers' brokers owe their fiduciary
duties to the buyer; the typical rationalization is that the buyer indi-
rectly pays the commission as part of the sales price. Buyers' brokers
sometimes want the buyer to sign exclusive agency contracts and ask
for retainers. Others are paid a percentage commission by the buyer,
such as two to three percent of the buyer's target price or a split of the
listing agent's commission.67 Some prefer the buyer to pay an hourly
rate, usually in the range of sixty to one hundred dollars per hour, for
their services. 68
For these fees, the buyers' brokers claim that they obtain for their
clients reductions in sales prices from four to seven percent. 69 A sur-
vey conducted by U.S. Sprint substantiates this claim. The survey re-
ported that 232 relocating employees who hired buyers' brokers paid
on average 91% of a home's list price, while those using traditional
agents paid 96.5% of the list price.70 With such documented results,
the concept of buyers' brokerage has gained acceptance by the real es-
tate industry.71 Because the relationship conforms to the buyer's ex-
pectation that the broker is the buyer's loyal representative working
to protect the buyer's best interests, it is a rational approach. How-
ever, the practice can lead to dual agency when the buyer is interested
in one of the broker's own listings. As noted previously, most MLS
rules still require selling broker subagency to the listing broker in an
in-house sale.
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS/TRANSACTION BROKERS/FACILITATORS
Brokers have lobbied for independent contractor status with in-
creasing success in recent years. Basically, this form of brokerage is
Frank Cook, Advocates Say Real Estate Agents Should Vow 'Loyalty,' MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 22, 1993 at 4G.
66. Id.




71. Joe Catalano, More Punch-Brokers Who Represent Buyers Trying To Boost Visi-
bility And Business. Sidebar: More About Buyer's Brokers, NEWSDAY, Sept. 12, 1992 at
26 Real Estate (discussing growth of buyers' brokers in New York).
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non-representative. Brokers act as finders, putting buyers and sellers
in contact and facilitating the progress of the deal. Neither party con-
trols the independent contractor whose only responsibility is to pro-
duce a closed transaction. Independent contractors cannot bind either
party or make any decisions on either party's behalf. While this elimi-
nates liability of the principal (either the buyer or seller) for the
agent's acts, it also eliminates remedies available under agency law.
Most statutes that allow independent contractor status require that
the broker act reasonably and in good faith; some statutes have a list
of specific limited duties. This independent contractor status seems to
add to the confusion. The traditional seller agency aproach contra-
dicts the buyer's expectations; the independent contractor approach
contradicts the expectations of both the buyer and the seller who ex-
pect loyalty in exchange for commissions. It is also uncertain to what
degree brokers will dispel the parties' perception of loyalty when at-
tempting to obtain business. 72
IV. SIGNIFICANT LITIGATION INVOLVING REAL ESTATE
BROKER AGENCY AND DISCLOSURE
A. DsMuA V. EDINA REALTYY INC.73
Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc. involved sellers who sued the realty
company for representing both the sellers and the buyers without ade-
quately disclosing the realty company's dual agency. 74 Edina Realty
disclosed the dual agency status using one of its own forms, signed by
all of the parties. 75 The sellers sued for breach of fiduciary duty be-
cause Edina Realty did not adequately explain the dual agency to the
sellers. 76 Although the disclosure form complied with statutory re-
quirements, the form did not fulfill common law requirements of undi-
vided loyalty and complete disclosure. 77 The court subsequently
certified the case as a class action involving approximately 22,000 sell-
72. One Florida real estate firm, The Keyes Company, purports to operate exclu-
sively as a transaction brokerage, However, The Keyes Company recently distributed
promotional advertisements stating that the Company is acting as the "exclusive agent"
of two sellers in the author's neighborhood. This is a clear example of the misunder-
standing which exists between real estate agents and real estate brokers, and their
legal advisors. The agents who deal directly with the consuming public continue to cre-
ate a perception which is the opposite of what the broker/executives claim.
73. No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993).
74. Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771, at *1 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993).
75. Dismuke, 1993 WL 327771 at *1.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *3.
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ers.78 The court held that the common law fiduciary duty was inflexi-
ble, that Edina Realty had breached the common law duty, and that
the plaintiffs need not prove actual injury or intentional fraud.79 The
court found that "[n]othing will defeat the principal's right or remedy
except his own prior consent or ratification after full disclosure of all
the facts."80 Edina Realty lost its commissions. The parties ulti-
mately reached a settlement in the amount of $5.9 million, partially in
cash and partially in the form of transferable coupons for one hundred
dollar discounts on future real estate transactions.81 The settlement
was given final court approval in February, 1995.82
B. Boxusxy V. EDiNA REAzT, INC.8 3
This class action was brought by buyers and sellers under six the-
ories: breach of a state statute, breach of a real estate regulation,
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and noncompliance
with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO").8 4 These complaints resulted from allegations based upon a
conflict of interest due to dual agency.85 Again, Edina Realty relied on
its own disclosure form to explain the dual agency relationship.8 6
Edina Realty sought dismissal of the RICO claim and moved to stay,
abstain, and/or dismiss the federal court action, but the court denied
Edina Realty's motion. 87 The court also certified this case as a class
action.88 In February, 1995, Edina Realty reached a settlement with
the plaintiff class members in the aggregate amount of $12.3
million.89
78. See Neal Gendler, Firm May Make Market For Edina Realty Coupons: Way To
Sell Them May Be Part Of Settlement Order In Two Class-Action Lawsuits, MnRMApo-
LI STAR TRIBuNE, Jan. 21, 1995, at 1D.
79. Dismuke, 1993 WL 327771 at *3.
80. Id.
81. See Scott Carlson, Plaintiffs Win Cash in Agency Case, Cm. Tam., Feb. 12,
1995, at 7V [hereinafter Carlson]. Three $100 coupons were issued to each claimant,
each valid for one successive year. See Neal Gendler, Firm May Make Market For Edina
Realty Coupons: Way To Sell Them May Be Part Of Settlement Order In Two Class-
Action Lawsuits, M-NEAPOLIS STAR TRmIuNE, Jan. 21, 1995, at 1D.
82. Carlson, see supra note 81, at 7V.
83. No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).
84. Bokusky v. Edina Realty Inc., No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993 WL 515827, at *1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 6 1993).
85. Bokusky, 1993 WL 515827, at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at *11.
89. See Carlson, supra note 81 at 7V. The remaining $1.7 million covers damages
in a related suit involving two affiliates of Edina Realty. Id.
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C. HUIJES v. DEMARRAS 9°
In this action, the buyers sought specific performance of the
purchase contract, and the sellers cross-claimed against the buyers
and the real estate agent for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, rescission, and declaratory relief.9 1 The lower court held
for the buyers.9 2 The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6,
however, ruled that the sellers did not have to pay the real estate com-
mission even though the agent provided the sellers with an agency
disclosure form at the time the purchase contract was signed.98 The
California statute at issue required that the listing agent make the
agency disclosure when the seller signed the listing agreement. 9 4 Be-
cause of the improper timing of the agency disclosure, the court "re-
verse[d] for further findings on whether under the circumstances the
misstatement constituted grounds for revision [of the purchase con-
tract]."9 5 The court construed the disclosure statute as adding to,
rather than removing, common law duties of disclosure. 96 Conse-
quently, disclosure alone was not enough; disclosure must 'also be
timely and fully explained. This arguably requires a lawyer, not a
broker.
D. L. BYRON CULVER & Assoc. v. JAOUDI INDUS. & TRADING
L. Byron, a real estate firm, lost its sales commission in a land
sale for failing to disclose its dual agency relationship. 98 The real es-
tate firm acted as the buyers' broker. 99 When the firm found a suita-
ble property for the buyers, a broker for the firm contacted the
property owner and entered into a listing agreement with the
owner. 100 The broker never made formal disclosure of the dual repre-
sentation.1 0 1 In support of its holding affirming the real estate firm's
forefeiture of its commission, the court quoted a 1917 case stating:
The reason for the rule [requiring written disclosure of dual
agency or the loss of the commission] is that [the agent]
90. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
91. Huijers v. DeMarrais, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
92. Huijers, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235-36.
93. Id. at 239.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 238.
97. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
98. L. Bryon Culver & Assoc. v. Jaoudi Indus. & Trading Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680,
683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
99. L. Bryon Culver & Assoc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681.
100. Id.
101. Id at 671-82.
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thereby puts himself in a position where his duty to one con-
flicts with his duty to the other, where his own interests
tempt him to be unfaithful to both principals, a position
which is against sound public policy and good morals. His
contract for compensation being thus tainted, the law will not
permit him to enforce it against either party. It is no answer
to this objection to say that he did, in the particular case, act
fairly and honorably to both. The infirmity of his contract
does not arise from his actual conduct in the given case, but
from the policy of the law, which will not allow a man to gain
anything from a relation so conducive to bad faith and double
dealing.102
E. AMosER v. BERT, m 03
This case involved a prospective buyer suing a listing agent for
breach of fiduciary duty.10 4 The buyer claimed that the property's
listing agent owed the buyer a fiduciary duty because both the buyer's
broker and the listing agent worked for the same brokerage firm.' 0 5
Having gone out of business, the brokerage firm under which both the
listing and buyer's agent worked was never effectively served with
process. ' 06 This seems to explain why the plaintiff-buyer did not seek
relief against the firm for undisclosed dual agency and instead at-
tempted to hold the listing agent liable. The employer/broker should
be liable in such a case because the broker receives a percentage of
whatever sales the broker's agents produce.' 0 7 The brokerage firm is,
in effect, a dual agent for both parties, even if the listing agent and
buyer's agent claim allegiance only to the seller and buyer respec-
tively. However, the court stated that "this case does not, involve an
issue of dual agency."' 0 8 The buyer claimed that because the buyer's
agent worked for the same firm as the listing agent, the buyer's
agent's fiduciary duty applied to all members of the firm.' 0 9 The court
disagreed, holding that the listing agent could not be charged with the
buyer's agent's fiduciary duties or liability resulting from the breach of
those duties.1 1 The only action for which the listing agent could be
102. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Glenn v. Rice 162 P. 1020, 1021 (Cal. 1917)).
103. 858 P.2d 854 (N.M. 1993).
104. Moser v. Bertram, 858 P.2d 854, 854-55 (N.M. 1993).
105. Moser, 858 P.2d at 854-55.
106. Id. at 855 n.1.
107. See Fraioli v. Bobby Byrd Real Estate, Inc., 630 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that a real estate broker is liable for any misrepresentation by his
real estate agent regardless of agent's actual or apparent authority, where the broker
received a substantial commission from the seller based on the agent's actions).





liable is for fault in appointing, supervising, or cooperating with the
buyer's agent (i.e. no vicarious liability)."1
F. INLAND COMMERCIL PRop. SA- s v. ATLANTIC Assocs., INC.112
Inland, the broker, sued to recover its commission from the buyer,
Atlantic, which had contracted with Inland to acquire commercial
property."13 Inland acted as a dual agent, representing Atlantic as
well as the sellers, and claimed to have made adequate disclosure. 114
Atlantic argued that it had not consented to dual agency. 1 5 Each
party filed affidavits in support of motions for summary judgment.1 16
The court denied the motions, holding that there existed a genuine
issue of material fact as to Atlantic's consent to dual agency."17 The
Illinois real estate statute at issue in this case required written disclo-
sure of dual agency."18 Atlantic relied on the statute, but the court
ruled that the statute did not provide a private cause of action."19
This ruling effectively eviscerated the statute, preventing its applica-
tion where it was most needed, enforcing written disclosure. Illinois
has since enacted statutes requiring written disclosure. 120
G. MARKET FORCE, INC. v. WAUWATOSA REALTY Co. 2 1
This case discusses another aspect of the buyers' broker move-
ment. Market Force, Inc., a buyers' brokerage, firm sued Wauwatosa
Realty Co., another realty company, in an antitrust action.122 Market
Force claimed that, by paying only a referral fee and not a regular
commission, Wauwatosa and other Milwaukee firms were guilty of an-
titrust conspiracy. 123 Market Force operated exclusively as a buyers'
broker, pledging complete loyalty to buyers, though not charging a
commission. The listing brokers compensated Market Force through a
111. Id.
112. No. 90 C 1036, 1991 WL 278311 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1991).
113. Inland Commercial Property Sales v. Atlantic Assoc., Inc., No. 90 C 1036, 1991
WL 278311, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1991) (mem.).
114. Inland Commercial Property Sales, 1991 WL 278311 at *1 (mem.).
115. Id. (mem.).
116. Id. (mem.).
117. Id. at *2 (mem.).
118. Id. at *1 n.3 (mein.) (citing IiL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 para. 5818.2 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1991)).
119. Id. (mem.).
120. See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recently
enacted Real Estate License Act in Illinois.
121. 706 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff'd, 906 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1990).
122. Market Force, Inc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 706 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (E.D.
Wis. 1989), aff'd, 906 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1990).
123. Market Force, Inc., 706 F. Supp. at 1388.
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split commission. 12 4 Many real estate brokers operating under the
traditional subagency approach decided not to share their commis-
sions with Market Force, instead paying the buyers' broker a much
smaller referral fee. 125 The court held that Market Force failed to
show that the hostile firms had acted together in conspiring to hold
down commissions paid to buyers' brokers.126 The court found Wau-
watosa gave adequate reasons for its practice: 1) Wauwatosa might
have to pay a selling agent a commission in addition to that of the
buyer's broker, as can occur when the selling agent holds an open
house and the buyer's agent brings his client; 2) buyers' brokers do not
list on MLS and therefore have lower expenses; and 3) Wauwatosa
paid out-of-state brokers the same referral fee.12 7 This case is impor-
tant in that it discusses many of the issues which arise in real estate
agency transactions, including: the conflict created by the MLS pre-
sumption of subagency; the question of who really pays the commis-
sion - the seller, from the sales proceeds, or the buyer, as part of the
purchase price; and whether identification of the recipient of fiduciary
duties should be based on who pays the commission.
H. GiLLMORE v. MORELLI12 s
In this case, a real estate broker sued the seller to recover his
commission.129 The seller countersued to collect attorneys' fees the
seller incurred in defending against an action for specific performance
brought by the prospective purchaser. °3 0 The court ruled in favor of
the seller, denying the broker his commission and entering a judg-
ment against the broker for the seller's attorneys' fees in the prior ac-
tion.' 13 The court found that the purchase agreement the broker
executed while acting as the listing broker for the seller was so
favorable to the purchaser and unfavorable to the seller as to consti-
tute a breach of fiduciary duty.'3 2 The evidence also showed that the
broker actively assisted the buyer in negotiating the purchase
terms. 133
124. Id. at 1389.
125. Id. a 1390.
126. Id. at 1395-96.
127. Id. at 1390-91.
128. 472 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1991).
129. Gillmore v. Morelli, 472 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1991).
130. Gillmore, 472 N.W.2d at 739.
131. Id. at 741.





A. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS' NEw POLICY
On November 15, 1993, the National Association of Realtors
("NAR") met in Miami Beach, Florida, to decide what position to pro-
mote regarding the growing trend of buyers' brokers, dual agents, and
facilitators (also known as transaction brokers, independent contrac-
tors, or finders). NAR voted to ask each state legislature to enact
"statutory agency" to preempt the traditional common law agency
rules. This was undoubtedly in response to the large judgment en-
tered in the then recently decided Edina Realty cases. NAR also de-
cided not to endorse the facilitator concept, which allows brokers to act
as dealmakers and charge commissions without owing clients any fi-
duciary duties.
NAR formulated this policy based on the recommendations that
its Presidential Advisory Group on Agency listed in its March, 1992,
report. These recommendations resulted from a study finding that
most real estate agents do not understand the common law agency
rules. A NAR task force, created in 1985 in response to complaints by
consumer groups, conducted the study. This study also produced an
important change in MLS policies - as of July 1, 1993, an offer of
subagency by listing brokers using the service was no longer
mandatory. 134 Instead, listing brokers can now offer "cooperation and
compensation" to either subagents, buyers' agents, or both.13 5
. Additionally, NAR revised its Code of Ethics and Standards of
Practice to recognize buyer agency with fiduciary duties owed to the
buyer, not the seller.13 6 Brokers can act exclusively as selling/listing
agents or as buyers' agents. Brokers may combine the two, resulting
in a disclosed dual agency which is permitted for in-house sales.13 7
134. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTOR, HANDBOOK ON MULTIPLE LISTING POLICY
- RESIDENTIAL, § 1.2 (1993). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
135. Id. A new problem arises with this optional MLS arrangement: What is the
status of a selling broker who has no buyer's broker agreement, and who is not offered
subagency by the listing broker? See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS
OR PRACTICE (1994) (discussing Standard 7-1(c), which imposes a duty upon buyers' bro-
kers to submit all offers by the buyer; Standard 7-2, which provides that "[r]ealtors,
when seeking to become a buyer/tenant representative, shall not mislead buyers or ten-
ants as to savings or other benefits that might be realized through use of the [rlealtor's
services;" Standard 21-12, which states that "[rlealtors, acting as agents of buyers or
tenants, shall disclose that relationship to the seller/landlord's agent at first contact and
shall provide written confirmation of that disclosure to the seller/landlord's agent not
later than execution of a purchase agreement or lease").
137. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRAC-
TICE (1994). Standard 9-10(b) provides in relevant part: "When entering into contracts
to represent buyers/tenants, [r]ealtors must advise potential clients of: 1) the [r]ealtor's
general company policies regarding cooperation with other firms; and 2) any potential
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B. STATE LEGISLATION DEFINING PERMISSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS &
MANDATING DISCLOSURE
In response to the changes in real estate brokerage relationships
and the resulting problems, many states enacted laws requiring the
broker to disclose in writing who the broker represents. Generally,
these laws require the broker to provide the disclosure to all parties
involved in a transaction. However, a concerted effort has not been
made to address the need for uniformity in this area of the law.
Some states have very detailed laws defining the permissible ca-
pacities in which brokers may act as well as prescribing the items to
be included in the disclosure forms; some state statutes even include
approved disclosure forms that brokers must use. Other states just
have a vague requirement of disclosure that could constitute the un-
authorized practice of law. Many states require the broker to make
the required disclosures only before submitting an offer, which may be
too late in the relationship to be effective. Some states have abrogated
the common law of agency as applied to real estate brokers, while
most preserve the traditional agency presumption. The majority of
states have not taken any recent legislative action regarding real es-
tate brokers. Most of the new laws are recently enacted; some just
became effective in 1995. What follows is a survey of the salient provi-
sions of these new laws.
1. Comprehensive Provisions
a. California
The first state to enact comprehensive statutes defining agency
relationships in real property transactions and mandating disclosure
was California. 138 The relevant sections took effect January 1,
for the buyer/tenant representative to act as a disclosed dual agent, e.g., listing broker,
subagent, landlord's agent, etc." Id.
138. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2373-82 (West Supp. 1995). The stated legislative pur-
pose of the California act is as follows:
(a) Further the education of consumers on the existence of various types of
agency relationships which may occur in residential real property transactions
covered by this act.
(b) Require disclosure to the parties by the agent or agents of the various
types of agency relationships which may occur in residential real property
transactions covered by this act in a manner which explains in simple, compre-
hensible, and nontechnical terns, the elements of these relationships.(c) Afford protection to consumers involved in residential real property trans-
actions covered by this act by requiring the disclosure set forth in this act.
(d) Require uniformity of this disclosure as a means of clarifying consumer
understanding of these terms, usages, and relationships.
(e) Make clear that associate real estate licensees act as agents of brokers
under whom they are licensed and who, in turn, are agents of buyers, sellers, or
buyers and sellers in residential real property transactions covered by this act..
However, by this enactment, the Legislature does not intend to diminish any
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1988.139 As previously noted, the concept of buyers' brokers began to
take hold first during the mid to late eighties in the western states,
primarily in California. Section 2373 of the California Civil Code is an
extensive definitions section, providing definitions for "dual agent,"
"buyer," "listing agent," and "selling agent," among others. 140 Section
2374 requires that listing and selling agents provide the seller and
buyer in a residential real property transaction with a copy of a disclo-
sure form and obtain a signed acknowledgment of receipt from each
party.' 4 1 The listing agent must provide the disclosure in its pre-
scribed form to the seller prior to entering into the listing agree-
ment.1 42 The selling agent must do the same "as soon as practicable
prior to presenting the seller with an offer to purchase," unless the
selling agent is also the listing agent. 14 3 The selling agent must pro-
vide disclosure to the buyer:
as soon as practicable prior to execution of the buyer's offer to
purchase, except that if the offer to purchase is not prepared
by the selling agent, the selling agent shall present the disclo-
liability to buyers and sellers which may exist for tortious conduct in connec-
tion with these' real property transactions.
(f) Provide an explicit basis for maintaining the confidentiality of price infor-
mation provided by the consumer to a dual agent in a residential real property
transaction covered by this act and an explicit method for modifying that confi-
dentiality, while at the same time retaining without change the existing law
with respect to confidentiality of other information.
(g) Delay the requirements of this act until January 1, 1988, in order to pro-
vide sufficient time to familiarize consumers and agents with the provisions of
this act.
Id. at Historical Note.
139. See generally Ruth Ryon, New State Laws, Assist, Confuse Professionals, Los
ANGELES TnIEs, Dec. 20, 1987 at 20 Real Estate (reporting on California's new disclo-
sure and broker education laws).
140. "Dual agent" is defined as "an agent acting, either directly or through an associ-
ate licensee, as agent for both the seller and the buyer in a real property transaction."
CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2373 (d) (West Supp. 1995).
"Buyer" is defined as
a transferee in a real property transaction, and includes a person who executes
an offer to purchase real property from a seller through an agent, or who seeks
the services of an agent in more than a casual, transitory, or preliminary man-
ner, with the object of entering into a real property transaction. 'Buyer' in-
cludes vendee or lessee.
CAL. CirV. CODE § 2373(c) (West Supp. 1995).
"Listing agent" is defined as "a person who has obtained a listing of real property to
act as an agent for compensation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2373(f) (West Supp. 1995).
"Selling agent" is defined as
a listing agent who acts alone, or an agent who acts in cooperation with a list-
ing agent, and who sells or finds and obtains a buyer for the real property, or an
agent who locates property for a buyer or who finds a buyer for a property for
which no listing exists and presents an offer to purchase to the seller.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 2373(n) (West Supp. 1995).
141. Id. § 2374.
142. Id. § 2374(a).
143. Id. § 2374(b).
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sure form to the buyer not later than the next business day
after the selling agent receives the offer to purchase from the
buyer. 144
Section 2375 provides the statutory disclosure form which must
be used. 145 The prescribed language defines and lists the duties owed
by the "seller's agent," "buyer's agent," and "agent representing both
seller and buyer" and admonishes the consumer not to sign the disclo-
sure form without first having carefully read and understood the rela-
tionship being created. 146
An additional disclosure is required by section 2375.5: the real
estate agent must confirm the relationship "in the contract to
purchase and sell real property or in a separate writing executed or
acknowledged by the seller, the buyer, and the selling agent prior to or
coincident with execution of that contract."147 Section 2377 expressly
provides that the payment of compensation to an agent by either the
seller or buyer is "not necessarily determinative of a particular agency
relationship between an agent and the seller or buyer.' 48 Similarly,
the sharing of a commission between the listing and selling agent does
not necessarily imply any subagency relationship. 149 Section 2376
states what seems obvious: namely, that "[nlo selling agent in a real
property transaction may act as an agent for the buyer only, when the
selling agent is also acting as the listing agent in the transaction.
1 50
Additionally, listing agents can still act as selling agents, and this
dual role will not by itself create a dual agency. 151 The main prohibi-
tion imposed on dual agents is against disclosing one party's price ne-
gotiating limit to the other party.152 The relationship may be
modified "at any time before the performance of the act which is the
object of the agency with the written consent of the parties to the
agency relationship."153 The "object of the agency relationship" is ar-
guably to sell the property. Therefore, under the vague statement in
the statute, the parties seem able to alter their relationship up until
the contract is executed and possibly until closing.
Finally, the new disclosure requirements do not diminish the
common law duties of disclosure and fiduciary duties owed by agents,
144. Id. § 2374(d).
145. Id. § 2375.
146. Id. The statutory disclosure language is included in the Appendices to this Ar-
ticle. See Appendix B(1).
147. Id. § 2375.5(a).
148. Id. § 2377.
149. Id.
150. Id. § 2376.
151. Id. § 2380.
152. Id. § 2379.
153. Id. § 2381.
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nor are the common law remedies limited by the new laws.1 54 Escrow
agents are not deemed agents for purposes of these disclosure require-
ments. 155 California also requires real estate licensees to take a three
hour course in agency relationships and duties, "including instruction
in the disclosures to be made and the confidences to be kept in the
various agency relationships."156 Because the California State Legis-
lature did not expressly abrogate common law fiduciary duties, the
same situation exists for potential Edina Realty type litigation. Fur-
thermore, the point at which the broker must disclose, "before execut-
ing an offer," may be too late in the relationship. As this Article notes,
other states impose the duty to disclose much earlier - "at the first
substantive contact."
b. Colorado
In 1993, Colorado made comprehensive changes to its real estate
brokerage laws, complete with new specifically defined brokerage ca-
pacities. 157 Colorado also added specific sections dealing with each
154. Id. § 2382.
155. Id. § 1102.11.
156. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10170.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
157. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 12-61-801-811 (Supp. 1994). Section 12-61-802 pro-
vides the new brokerage capacities definitions as follows:
(1) "Broker" shall have the same meaning as set forth in subsection (2) or (3) of
section 12-61-101, except as otherwise specified in this part 8. For purposes of
this part 8, "broker" may include a "salesperson" as defined in section 12-61-
101(3).
(2) "Dual agent" means a broker who, with the written informed consent of all
parties to a contemplated real estate transaction, is engaged as a limited agent
for both the seller and buyer or both the landlord and tenant.(3) "Limited agent" means an agent whose duties and obligations to a principal
are only those set forth in section 12-61-804, 12-61-805, or 12-61-806, with any
additional duties and obligations agreed to pursuant to section 12-61-803(5).
(4) "Single agent" means a broker who is engaged by and represents only one
party in a real estate transaction. A single agent includes the following:
(a) "Buyer's agent", which means a broker who is engaged by and represents
the buyer in a real estate transaction;
(b) "Landlord's agent", which means a broker who is engaged by and repre-
sents the landlord in a leasing transaction;
(c) "Seller's agent", which means a broker who is engaged by and represents
the seller in a real estate transaction; and
(d) "Tenant's agent", which means a broker who is engaged by and represents
the tenant in a leasing transaction.
(5) "Subagent" means a broker engaged to act for another broker in performing
brokerage tasks for a principal. The subagent owes the same obligations and
responsibilities to the principal as does the principal's broker.
(6) "Transaction-broker" means a broker who assists one or more parties
throughout a contemplated real estate transaction with communication, inter-
position, advisement, negotiation, contract terms, and the closing of such real
estate transaction without being an agent or advocate for the interests of any
party to such transaction. Upon agreement in writing pursuant to section 12-
61-803(2)(a) or a written disclosure pursuant to section 12-61-808(2)(d), a
transaction-broker may become a single agent, subagent, or dual agent.
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type of brokerage relationship and a section providing that the source
of compensation does not determine agency.15 8 Under the new law, a
broker may act as a single agent for either the buyer or seller, sub-
agent, dual agent, or transaction broker.159 Unless otherwise speci-
fied, the Colorado statutory scheme considers brokers to be
transaction brokers. ' 60 The statute lists each type of brokerage rela-
tionship and implies an abrogation of common law agency and its fidu-
Id.
158. Id. §§ 12-61-801-811.
159. Id. § 12-61-803.
160. Id. Section 12-61-803 provides that transaction brokers have the following du-
ties and obligations:
(a) To perform the terms of any written or oral agreement made with any party
to the transaction;
(b) To exercise reasonable skill and care as a transaction-broker, including, but
not limited to:
(I) Presenting all offers and counteroffers in a timely manner regardless of
whether the property is subject to a contract for sale or lease or letter of intent;
(II) Advising the parties regarding the transaction and suggesting that such
parties obtain expert advice as to material matters about which the transac-
tion-broker knows but the specifics of which are beyond the expertise of such
broker;
(III) Accounting in a timely manner for all money and property received;
(IV) Keeping the parties fully informed regarding the transaction;
(V) Assisting the parties in complying with the terms and conditions of any
contract including closing the transaction;
(VI) Disclosing to all prospective buyers or tenants any adverse material facts
actually known by the broker including but not limited to adverse material
facts pertaining to the title, the physical condition of the property, any defects
in the property, and any environmental hazards affecting the property required
by law to be disclosed;
(VII) Disclosing to any prospective seller or landlord all adverse material facts
actually known by the the broker including but not limited to adverse material
facts pertaining to the buyer's or tenant's financial ability to perform the terms
of the transaction and the buyer's intent to occupy the property as a principal
residence; and
(VIII) Informing the parties that as seller and buyer or as landlord and tenant
they shall not be vicariously liable for any acts of the transaction-broker;
(c) To comply with all requirements of this article and any rules promulgated
pursuant to this article; and
(d) To comply with any applicable federal, state, or local laws, rules, regula-
tions, or ordinances including fair housing and civil rights statutes or
regulations.
(3) The following information shall not be disclosed by a transaction-broker
without the informed consent of all parties:
(a) That a buyer or tenant is willing to pay more than the purchase price or
lease rate offered for the property;
(b) That a seller or landlord is willing to accept less than the asking price or
lease rate for the property;
(c) What the motivating factors are for any party buying, selling, or leasing the
property;
(d) That a seller, buyer, landlord, or tenant will agree to financing terms other
than -those offered;
(e) Any facts or suspicions regarding circumstances which may psychologically
impact or stigmatize any real property pursuant to section 38-35.5-101, C.R.S.;
or
1995] BUYERS' BROKERS 57
ciary duties. 16 1 This abrogation, however, is not expressly stated.
(f) Any material information about the other party unless disclosure is re-
quired by law or failure to disclose such information would constitute fraud or
dishonest dealing.
(4) A transaction-broker has no duty to conduct an independent inspection of
the property for the benefit of the buyer or tenant and has no duty to indepen-
dently verify the accuracy or completeness of statements made by the seller,
landlord, or independent inspectors.
(5) A transaction-broker has no duty to conduct an independent investigation
of the buyer's or tenant's financial condition or to verify the accuracy or com-
pleteness of any statement made by the buyer or tenant.
(6) A transaction-broker may do the following without breaching any obliga-
tion or responsibility:
(a) Show alternative properties not owned by the seller or landlord to a pro-
spective buyer or tenant;
(b) List competing properties for sale or lease;
(c) Show properties in which the buyer or tenant is interested to other prospec-
tive buyers or tenants; and
(d) Serve as a single agent, subagent, or dual agent for the same or for different
parties in other real estate transactions.
(7) There shall be no imputation of knowledge or information between any
party and the transaction-broker or among persons within an entity engaged as
a transaction-broker.
(8) A transaction-broker may cooperate with other brokers but shall not en-
gage any subagents.
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-61-803 (Supp. 1994).
161. Id. § 12-61-804. Section 12-61-804 provides that single agents engaged by the
seller have the following duties and obligations:
(a) To perform the terms of the written agreement made with the '[party
represented];
(b) To exercise reasonable skill and care for the [party represented];
(c) To promote the interests of the [party represented] with the utmost good
faith, loyalty, and fidelity, including, but not limited to:
(I) Seeking a price and terms which are acceptable to the [party represented];
except that the broker shall not be obligated to seek additional offers to
purchase the property while the property is subject to a contract for sale or to
seek additional offers to lease the property while the property is subject to a
lease or letter of intent to lease;
(II) Presenting all offers to and from the [party represented] in a timely man-
ner regardless of whether the property is subject to a contract for sale or a lease
or letter of intent to lease;
(III) Disclosing to the [party represented] adverse material facts actually
known by the broker;
(IV) Counseling the [party represented] as to any material benefits or risks of a
transaction which are actually known by the broker;
(V) Advising the [party represented] to obtain expert advice as to material
matters about which the broker knows but the specifics of which are beyond the
expertise of such broker;
(VI) Accounting in a timely manner for all money and property received; and
(VII) Informing the [party represented] that such [party] may be vicariously
liable for the acts of such [party's] agent or any subagent when the broker is
acting within the scope of the agency relationship;
(d) To comply with all requirements of this article and any rules promulgated
pursuant to this article; and
(e) To comply with any applicable federal, state, or local laws, rules, regula-
tions, or ordinances including fair housing and civil rights statutes or
regulations.
(2) The following information shall not be disclosed by a broker acting as a
[party's] agent without the informed consent of the [party represented]:
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The state real estate commission is to provide the specific disclosure
forms the broker must use. 162 The statute also preserves freedom of
contract by allowing the parties to make agreements providing for ad-
ditional duties. 163 Brokers must advise the parties that the disclosure
has legal consequences and urge them to consult legal counsel before
(a) That [the party represented] is willing to accept less than the asking price
or lease rate for the property;
(b) What the motivating factors are for the party [in] the property;
(c) That the [party represented] will agree to financing terms other than those
offered;
(d) Any material information about the [party represented] unless disclosure is
required by law or failure to disclose such information would constitute fraud
or dishonest dealing; or
(e) Any facts or suspicions regarding circumstances which may psychologically
impact or stigmatize any real property pursuant to section 38-35.5-101, C.R.S.
(3)(a) A broker acting as a [party's] agent owes no duty or obligation to the
[party not represented]; except that a broker shall, subject to the limitations of
section 38-35.5-101, C.R.S., concerning psychologically impacted property, dis-
close to any prospective [party] all adverse material facts actually known by
such broker. Such adverse material facts may include but shall not be limited
to adverse material facts pertaining to the title and the physical condition of
the property, any material defects in the property, and any environmental
hazards affecting the property which are required by law to be disclosed.
(b) A [party's] agent owes no duty to conduct an independent inspection of the
property for the benefit of the [party not represented] and owes no duty to inde-
pendently verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement made by [the
party represented] or any independent inspector.
(4) A seller's or landlord's agent may show properties not owned by such seller
or landlord to prospective buyers or tenants and may list competing properties
for sale or lease and not be deemed to have breached any duty or obligation to
such seller or landlord.
(5a) A seller or landlord may agree in writing with a seller's or landlord's
agent that other brokers may be retained and compensated as subagents.
(b) Any broker acting as a subagent on the seller's or landlord's behalf shall be
a limited agent with the obligations and responsibilities set forth in subsections
(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this section.
Id. § 12-61-804. See id. § 12-61-805 (describing a single agent's duties when engaged by
the buyer).
Dual agents have the same duties as single agents, but may also disclose any infor-
mation to one party that is gained from the other party if such information is relevant to
the transaction or party. A dual agent must inform the parties that each may be held
vicariously liable for the acts of the dual agent. See id. § 12-61-806(1). Section 12-61-
806(4) provides that dual agents may not disclose any of the following without the in-
formed written consent of the parties:
(a) That a buyer or tenant is willing to pay more than the purchase price or
lease rate offered for the property;
(b) That a seller or landlord is willing to accept less than the asking price or
lease rate for the property;
(c) What the motivating factors are for any party buying, selling, or leasing the
property;
(d) That a seller, buyer, landlord, or tenant will agree to financing terms other
than those offered; and
(e) Any facts or suspicions regarding circumstances which may psychologically
impact or stigmatize any real property pursuant to section 38-35.5-101, C.R.S.
Id. § 12-61-806(4).
162. Id. § 12-61-803(4).
163. Id. § 12-61-803(5).
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signing such forms.16 4 Whether consumers will actually take this ad-.
vice remains to be seen. If consumers seek and rely on the broker's
explanations, such actions could amount to an unauthorized practice
of law.
c. Florida
Florida amended its real estate broker laws in 1994 to include
new definitions for "fiduciary," "disclosed dual agent," "transaction
broker," and "single agent."1 65 The amended statute also provides
that the Florida Real Estate Commission may suspend, impose a fine
upon, or issue a reprimand to any broker who fails to give written
notice of the required agency disclosure to all parties involved in the
transaction. 166 The broker must make the-disclosure to the party rep-
resented when the agreement for representation is entered into and to
the party not represented at the first substantive contact.' 67 Florida
permits dual agency if the broker obtains the informed written con-
sent of all parties.' 68 By consenting to dual agency, the parties lose
the right to the agent's undivided loyalty. 16 9 Transaction brokers,
who are essentially independent contractors, must also disclose their
164. Id. § 12-61-803(4).
165. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.01(1)(i) (West 1991 Supp. 1995). Section 475.01(1)(i)
provides the definition of "fiduciary" as "a broker in a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between that broker as agent and the seller or buyer as principal. The duties of
the broker as a fiduciary are loyalty, confidentiality, obedience, full disclosure, and ac-
counting and the duty to use skill, care, and diligence." Id.
Section 475.01(1)j) provides the definition of "disclosed dual agent" as
a broker who works as an agent for both the buyer and the seller. The broker
must obtain the informed consent in writing of all parties to the transaction to
be a disclosed dual agent. The disclosed dual agent has all the duties of a fidu-
ciary except full disclosure between the buyer and seller.
Id. § 475.01(l)(j).
Section 475.01(1)(k) provides the definition of "transaction broker" as
a broker who facilitates a brokerage transaction between a buyer and a seller.
The transaction broker does not affirmatively represent either the buyer or the
seller as an agent, and no fiduciary duties exist except for the duty of account-
ing and the duty to use skill, care, and diligence. However, the transaction
broker shall treat the buyer and seller with honesty and fairness and shall
disclose all known facts materially affecting th6'value of th' property in resi-
dential transactions to both the buyer and seller. The broker's role as a trans-
action broker must be fully disclosed in writing to the buyer and seller.
Id. § 475.01(1)(k).
Section 475.01(1) provides the definition of "single agent" is defined as "a broker
who represents, as a fiduciary, either the buyer or seller but not both in the same trans-
action." Id. § 475.01(1).
166. Id. § 475.25 (q). Rule 61J2-24.001 of the Florida Administrative Code, which
provides disciplinary guidelines for the Florida Real Estate Commission, prescribes li-
cense suspension of up to five years as the penalty for nondisclosure. FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. R. 61J2-24.001 (1994).
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.25(q) (West 1991 Supp. 1995).




role to all parties. 17 0 The source of compensation does not determine
or create agency.17 1 The statute does not mention any abrogation of
common law agency and does not specify the disclosure form the bro-
ker must use.
d. Georgia
In 1993, Georgia passed the Brokerage Relationships in Real Es-
tate Transactions Act ("Act"). 172 The Act abrogates common law
agency as applied to real estate brokers and replaces it with specifi-
cally defined statutory relationships. The Act also includes a defini-
tions section. The most notable term defined is "limited agent," which
means "a broker who, acting under the authority of a brokerage en-
gagement, solicits offers to purchase, sell, lease, or exchange real prop-
erty without being subject to the control of the client except as to the
result of the work."173 The Act deems a broker a limited agent "unless
a different legal relationship between the broker and the person for
whom the broker performs... is intended and is reduced to writing
and signed by the parties."174
As a limited agent, a broker owes no fiduciary duties to any party
and is only responsible for exercising ordinary care in the discharge of
the broker's services. 17 5 A broker engaged by the seller must comply
with all contractual provisions of the listing agreement, promote the
seller's interests by seeking a sale at terms acceptable to the seller,
and disclose all material facts of which the broker has actual knowl-
edge. 176 This listing or the seller's broker must treat prospective buy-
ers honestly and must not knowingly give false information. 177 The
listing broker must also disclose to buyers any adverse facts pertain-
ing to the condition of the property and may perform certain ministe-
rial acts for the buyer such as preparing offers and conveying them to
the seller; locating lenders, attorneys, and insurance agents; or per-
forming other similar acts without violating the duty to promote the
interests of the seller. 178 The Act contains a reciprocal section dealing
with brokers engaged by buyers. 179
170. Id. § 475.25(q)(3).
171. Id. § 475.255.
172. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-6A-1-14 (Harrison Supp. 1993).
173. Id. § 10-6A-3. This section also contains definitions distinguishing between
"customer" and "client" and "brokerage engagement" and "ministerial acts." See id.
174. Id. § 10-6a-4.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 10-6a-5.
177. Id. § 10-6a-5(b).
178. Id. § 10-6a-5(b)(c).
179. Id. § 10-6a-7.
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Another section of the Act expressly states that payment of com-
pensation to a broker does not determine the brokerage relation-
ship.' 8 0 Georgia allows dual agency as long as the broker makes a
complete written disclosure signed by all parties.1 8 1 Although the Act
contains no actual disclosure form, the Act lists the requirements for
compliance. 182 Additionally, a broker's participation in the MLS does
not create subagency on the part of selling agents who are not the
listing agents.183
e. Illinois
,Illinois recently amended its Real Estate License Act of 1983 to
include Article 4 - Brokerage Relations ("Article 4"). The amendment
took effect on January 1, 1995, and supersedes common law agency.18 4
Article 4 allows for the use of the "designated agency" concept to avoid
dual agency.' 8 5 A "designated agent" is an affiliated licensee who is
named by a broker as the legal agent of the broker's client when the
other party to the transaction is represented by the same broker or
another affiliated licensee of the broker. ' 8 6 This is the equivalent of a
"chinese wall" situation in a law firm when one of the firm's attorneys
180. Id. § 10-6a-11.
181. Id. § 10-6a-12.
182. Id. Section 10-6a-12 provides in relevant part:
(a) A broker may act as a dual agent only with the written consent of all cli-
ents. Such written consent shall be presumed to have been given and to be
informed as against any client who signs a writing or writings which contains
the following:
(1) A description of the transactions or types of transactions in which the bro-
ker will serve as a dual agent;
(2) A statement that, in serving as a dual agent, the broker represents two
clients whose interests are or at times could be different or even adverse;
(3) A statement that a dual agent may not disclose to any client information
made confidential by request or instructions from another client, except infor-
mation allowed to be disclosed by this Code section or required to be disclosed
by this Code section or required to be disclosed by this chapter;
(4) A statement that the broker or the broker's affiliated licensees have no ma-
terial relationship with either client other than that incidental to the transac-
tions, or if the broker or the broker's affiliated licensees have such a
relationship, a disclosure of the nature of such a relationship. For the purposes
of this Code section, a material relationship shall mean any actually known
personal, familial, or business relationship between the broker or the broker's
affiliated licensees and a client which would impair the ability of the broker or
affiliated licensees to exercise fair and independent judgment relative to an-
other client;
(5) A statement that the client does not have to consent to the dual agency; and
(6) A statement that the consent of the client has been given voluntarily and
that the engagement has been read and understood.
Id. § 10-6a-12(a).
183. Id. § 10-6a-13.
184. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 455, § 38.5(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995).
185. See id. §§ 38.15, 38.50.
186. Id. § 38.10.
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represents a party whose interests are adverse to those of another cli-
ent the firm represents. Article 4 creates a presumption that a real
estate licensee is the designated agent of the party for whom the licen-
see is working, unless the broker and the consumer enter into a writ-
ten agreement to the contrary or the licensee performs only
ministerial acts on behalf of the customer.' 8 7
As with other states, the source of compensation does not deter-
mine agency.' 88 Article 4 specifically lists the broker's duties and
states that a broker representing the buyer will not be presumed to
have breached a duty by accepting from the seller a commission based
on the selling price.' 8 9 Furthermore, participation in the MLS does
not create subagency.190 Article 4 also provides that there is no vica-
rious liability on the part of clients for the acts of the licensees. 191
One potential problem in the Illinois approach lies with its disclo-
sure requirements. No form is provided, and brokers are required
only to "advise" consumers. 192 Article 4 requires a broker to make a
written disclosure to those whom the broker is not representing, "at a
time intended to prevent disclosure of confidential information" and
no later than the time when an offer is prepared. 193 Article 4's man-
date that brokers "advise" clients about, agency law rather than re-
quiring brokers to complete a prescribed disclosure form arguably
constitutes an unauthorized practice of law.
f. Indiana
The Indiana statute distinguishes between a "client" and a "cus-
tomer" and further provides that a broker owes fiduciary duties only
to "clients."194 Indiana allows for real estate brokers/agents to act as
traditional sellers' agents, as buyers' brokers, or as limited agents.
The statute defines a "limited agent" as a dual agent with express lim-
ited and divided duties owed to the buyer and seller.195 By listing
187. Id. § 38.15.
188. Id. § 38.40.
189. Id. §§ 38.20, 38.25, 38.45 (discussing a licensees duty to the customer, the licen-
see's relationship with the client, and dual agency, respectively). Id. § 38.20 (c). This is,
of course, an attempt to deny reality by statute.
190. Id. § 38.55.
191. Id. § 38.60.
192. Id. § 38.35.
193. Id. § 38.35(b). But see id. § 38.45 (allowing for the creation of dual agency and
proscribing the specific written disclosures the broker must make prior to entering the
dual agency relationship).
194. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-34.1-10-4, 25-34.1-10-5, 25-34.1-10.6 (Burns 1995) (de-
fining "brokerage relationship," "client," and "customer," respectively).
195. Id. § 25-34.1-10-7. Section 25-34.1-10-12 provides in relevant part:
(a) A broker may act as a limited agent only with the written consent of all
parties to a real estate transaction. The written consent is presumed to have
[Vol. 29
BUYERS' BROKERS
each of the duties and disclosures required of each type of agent, the
Indiana statute attempts to deal with the issue of divided loyalties by
abrogating the common law and creating statutory agency. 196 Similar
to the other states which have enacted comprehensive statutes, com-
pensation does not determine agency. 197 The statute also requires
brokers to develop and implement a written office policy which identi-
fies and describes the types of brokerage relationships in which the
office will engage with its clients.3198
g. Maine
Maine requires "a meaningful, written real estate brokerage
agency relationship disclosure form as defined and mandated by rules
been given and all parties are considered informed for any party who signs a
writing or writings at the time of entering into a brokerage relationship with
the broker that contains the following:
(1) A description of the real estate transaction or types of real estate transac-
tions in which the broker will serve as a limited agent.
(2) A statement that in serving as a limited agent, the broker represents par-
ties whose interests are different or even adverse.
(3) A statement that a limited agent shall not disclose the following without
the informed consent, in writing, of the parties to the real estate transaction:
(A) Any material or confidential information, except adverse material facts or
risks actually known by the broker concerning the physical condition of the
property and facts required by statute, rule, or regulation to be disclosed and
that could not be discovered by a reasonable and timely inspection of the prop-
erty by the parties.
(B) That a buyer or tenant will pay more than the offered purchase price or
offered lease rate for the property.
(C) That a seller or landlord will accept less than the listed price or lease rate
for the property.
(D) What motivates a party to buy, sell, or lease the property.
(E) Other terms that would create a contractual advantage for one
'(1) party over another party.
(4) A statement that there will be no imputation of knowledge or information
between any party and the limited agent or among brokers within an entity
engaged as a limited agent.
(5) A statement that a party does not have to consent to the limited agency.
(6) A statement that the consent of each party has been given voluntarily and
that any limited agency disclosure has been read and understood.
(b) Under a brokerage engagement, a broker may assign different salespersons
affiliated with the broker to represent exclusively different clients in the same
transaction. The salespersons may not disclose, except to the salesperson's bro-
ker, information made confidential by request or instructions of the client the
salesperson is representing, except information permitted or required to be dis-
closed under this chapter. The broker may not be considered to be acting for
more than one (1) party to a real estate transaction.
(c) A cause of action does not arise against a broker for disclosing or failing to
disclose information in compliance with this section, and the limited agent does
not terminate the limited agency relationship by making a required disclosure.
Id. § 25-34.1-10-12.
196. Id. § 25-34.1-10-15.
197. Id. § 25-34.1-10-13 (d).
198. Id. § 25-34.1-10-13(a).
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adopted by the [state real estate] commission." 19 9 The duties of seller
agents, buyer agents, and disclosed dual agents are listed in separate
sections. 20 0 Maine codifies the common law fiduciary duties, and the
parties may create a different relationship through contractual agree-
ment.20 1 Furthermore, brokers may perform "ministerial acts such as
preparing offers and conveying offers" without creating a formal rela-
tionship.20 2 A listing broker may avoid dual agency by appointing
specific salespersons affiliated with the broker's firm to act as the
agents of the client to the exclusion of all other affiliated licensees. 20 3
This is similar to the Illinois "designated agent" aproach discussed
earlier in this Article. By so doing, the broker and the appointed
agents are only responsible for the actual knowledge and information
each possesses. Maine further provides that there is no "imputation of
knowledge or information by operation of law" merely because the ap-
pointed agent representing one party is affiliated with the broker rep-
resenting the other party.2
04
h. Maryland
Maryland amended its disclosure law, effective January 1,
1995.205 The new statute combines definitions and disclosure require-
ments into one section. The definition provision does not mention
"transaction brokers" or "independent contractors." 20 6 The required
disclosure must occur no later than the "first scheduled face-to-face
contact with the seller or lessor or the buyer or lessee."20 7 The statute
does not include a disclosure form but does provide the information
such forms must include. 20 8 The disclosure provisions apply only in
residential real estate transactions involving one, two, three, or four
single-family units.20 9
199. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13279 (West Supp. 1994).
200. See id. §§ 13273-75.
201. Id. § 13272.
202. Id. § 13273 (2) (C).
203. Id. § 13278.
204. Id. § 13278(3).
205. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 17-528 (1995).
206. See id. § 17-528(a).
207. Id. § 17-528(b)(2).
208. Id. § 17-528(b)(5). The disclosure must explain the following differences be-
tween a buyer's agent, seller's agent, dual agent, and cooperatng agent; the duties of the
broker to exercise reasonable care, diligence, and confidentiality; a presumption that a
seller agency exists absent an agreement to the contrary; that regardless of agency, a
broker must act honestly, fairly and in good faith; that the broker is not qualified to
advise on tax and legal matters; that all agreements, duties, and manner of compensa-
tion need to be in writing-, that dual agency could possibly arise later; that the client
may refer complaints to the real estate commission. Id.




Michigan's statute took effect on January 1, 1994, and requires
the broker to make disclosure of the agency relationship and the du-
ties owed to the buyer or seller.210 Brokers must tailor their disclo-
sure forms to conform to the prescribed details. 211 The statute
permits dual agency "without the full range of fiduciary duties owed
by a buyer's agent and a seller's agent."21 2 Michigan also allows bro-
kers to act as "transaction coordinators" who are not agents for either
party.21 3
j. Minnesota
Minnesota preserves common law agency but also establishes
minimum standards governing broker duties.214 Minnesota courts
addressed this apparent discrepancy in the Edina Realty cases where
the court found Edina Realty breached the more stringent common
law duties. To clarify the Edina Realty decisions, the Minnesota Leg-
islature, effective April 14, 1994, added a statement to its disclosure
statute, providing that disclosures complying with the statute are suf-
ficient to meet common law disclosure requirements. 21 5 This still pre-
serves the common law but attempts to prevent further litigation
similar to Edina Realty.
Minnesota permits a broker to act as a buyer's broker or dual
agent provided the broker discloses the relationship to the parties in
the prescribed form. 21 6 If a party refuses to consent to dual agency,
the refusing party may not participate in a sales transaction involving
the other represented party.2 17 The disclosure form advises clients to
keep to themselves all information they do not want revealed. 218
k. Nebraska
Nebraska enacted a comprehensive act defining the agency rela-
tionships created by real estate brokerage, operative July 1, 1995.219
After finding that "the application of the common law of agency to the
relationships between real estate brokers or salespersons and persons
210. MIcH. Comn. LAws ANN. § 339.2517 (West Supp. 1995).
211. Id. § 339.2517(2).
212. Id. § 339.2517(3)(c).
213. Id..§ 339.2517(3)(g).
214. M-N. STAT. ANN. § 82.197 (West Supp. 1995).
215. Id. § 82.197 Subd. 3.
216. Id. § 82.197 Subd. 1-2.
217. Id. § 82.197 Subd. 4(c).
218. Id. § 82.197 Subd. 4(d). The statutory disclosure language is included in the
Appendices to this Article. See Appendix B(2).
219. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-2401-30 (Supp. 1994).
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who are sellers, landlords, buyers, or tenants of rights and interests in
real propety has resulted in misunderstandings and consequences
that are contrary to the best interests of the public[,]" the legislature
then concluded that "it is in the best interests of the public to codify in
statute the relationships."220
The legislature began by redefining the brokerage relationship as
a 'limited agency" and then specified the duties of the limited agent
for each situation.221 A broker representing only a seller, landlord,
buyer, or tenant is a "single agent."222 Unless a dual agency relation-
ship occurs, the statute implies that the selling broker may be consid-
ered the subagent of the listing broker.223 Absent an agreement to the
contrary, the broker is a limited agent of the buyer or tenant.224
The statute requires the broker to disclose the duties and obliga-
tions which arise from this limited agency relationship. 225 Other du-
ties of disclosure and confidentiality depend on the party for whom the
broker is the "limited agent." Where the broker is acting as the
seller's or landlord's agent, the broker must disclose to the client all
facts which materially affect the value of the property and may not
disclose any of the client's confidential information. 226 The seller's
broker has no duty to the buyer, except to reveal adverse information
that the broker actually knows.227 The buyer's broker must disclose
to the buyer any material adverse information about the property that
the broker actually knows and must not reveal any of the buyer's con-
fidential information. 228 A dual agent may not reveal prescribed in-
formation regarding the buyer to the seller and about the seller to the
buyer as well as any confidential information.229 In addition, a listing
broker or a subagent of the listing broker must disclose in writing to
any prospective buyer or tenant the type, of relationship the broker
220. Id. § 76-2401(1), (3).
221. Id. §§ 76-2417(1), 76-2418(1), 76-2419(2) (identifying the broker as a limited
agent and defining the limited agents duties when acting as a seller's broker, buyer
broker's or dual agent)
222. Id. § 76-2414.
223. Id. § 76-2415, 76-2419.
224. Id. § 76-2416(2).
225. Id. § 76-2416(1).
226. Id. §§ 76-2417(1)(c)(iii), 76-2417(2).
227. Id. § 76-2417(3).
228. Id. §§ 76-2418(1)(c)(iii), 76-24,18(2).
229. Id. §§ 2419(4), 2419(5)(a). Section 2419(4) provides that a dual agent must not
disclose:
without the informed written consent of the client to whom the information
pertains: (a) That a buyer or tenant is willing to pay more than the purchase
price or lease rate offered for the property; (b) That a seller or landlord is will-
ing to accept less than the asking price or lease rate for the property; (c) What
the motivating factors are for any client buying, selling, or leasing the property;




has with the seller or landlord and, consequently, the possible rela-
tionship the broker could offer that prospective buyer or tenant.230
1. New York
New York's agency disclosure statute has been in effect since
1991.231 The statute provides definitions for buyer's and seller's
agents, but not for dual agents. 232 The statute does not mention
transaction brokers.233 The prescribed disclosure forms permit and
explain dual agency. 234 The disclosure form is very user friendly and
leaves little for consumers to ask their lawyers. All agents assisting in
the transaction must provide the form to the parties.23 5 This require-
ment means that the parties will likely see and sign the form more
than once in a transaction. The last subsection of the statute states
that it does not "limit or alter the application of the common law of
agency with respect to residential real estate transactions."236
m. Oregon
Oregon's approach is similar to New York's. Specifically, Oregon
preserves common law duties and remedies. 237 The statute provides a
definition section that does not mention transaction brokers or dual
agents, but dual agency is permissible. 238 Single agents owe their
principal the common law fiduciary duties of loyalty, obedience, disclo-
sure, confidentiality, reasonable care and diligence, and accounting in
dealings.239 Single agents also owe the party not represented by them
an affirmative obligation of honest dealing and disclosure. 240 The bro-
ker must make the required disclosure using the prescribed form at
the "first-substantive contact," which essentially means the first point
of communication. 241 The broker must confirm the disclosure again in
writing at the time a purchase contract is executed. 242 Agency is not
determined by source of compensation. 243
230. Id. § 76-2421(1)(b).
231. N.Y. RRAL PRop. § 443 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
232. Id. § 443(1).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 443(4). Part B(3) of the Appendices to this Article includes the prescribed
form. See Appendix B(3).
235. Id. § 443(3).
236. Id. § 443(6).
237. OR. REv. STAT. § 696.855 (1993).
238. Id. §§ 696.800, 696.815.
239. Id. §§ 696.805, 696.810.
240. Id.
241. Id. § 696.820. Part B(4) of the Appendices to this Article includes Oregon's pre-
scribed disclosure form. See Appendix B(4).
242. Id. § 696.845.




Rhode Island enacted its disclosure statute in 1989 and included a
definitions section and a section preserving common law agency.
244
Rhode Island allows independent contractor status through a written
contract conforming to the exemption requirements under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.2 45 All agents involved must disclose their status to
all parties involved in the transaction.246 The broker must make the
required disclosure to the buyers "as soon as practical, such as prior to
qualifying a buyer or showing property by appointment, and in all
cases prior to submission of a written offer to purchase."247 A signed
copy of the prescribed form must be provided to the listing agent when
the property is shown.248 Each purchase contract must include a con-
firmation of the agency relationships. 249 A broker may act as a dual
agent, provided additional disclosure forms are signed. 250
o. Wisconsin
Wisconsin's disclosure laws took effect on October 1, 1994.251 The
approach taken by Wisconsin consists of abrogating common law fidu-
ciary duties and replacing them with statutory duties. 252 In addition
to the specific statutory duties, brokers may agree to other duties and
obligations to meet the requirements of their clients. The statute re-
quires brokers to "maintain the confidentiality of all information given
to [them] in confidence and of all information obtained by the broker
that he or she knows a reasonable party would want to be kept confi-
dential, unless the information is required to be disclosed by law."
2 53
The client may make a list of specific information the client wants to
remain confidential. 25 4 By abrogating the common law principal/
agent relationship, clients are no longer vicariously liable for the acts
of the broker.255 Wisconsin does not provide an approved disclosure
form, but the form must state the name of the party or parties repre-
sented, the broker's duties, and a prescribed statement of confidential-
244. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-20.6-1-2 (Supp. 1994).
245. Id. § 5-20.6-2 (d). The statute does not specify to which section of the Internal
Revenue Code it is referring.
246. Id. § 5-20.6-7.
247. Id. § 5-20.6-4.
248. Id.
249. Id. § 5-20.6-7.
250. Id. § 5-20.6-8.
251. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 452.01 (West Supp. 1994).
252. Id. § 452.139.
253. Id. § 452.135 (d). Section 452.135(d) provides that the information required by
law is: "material adverse facts... [and] any facts known by the broker that contradict
any information included in a written inspection report on the property." Id.
254. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 452.135(d) (West Supp. 1994).
255. Id. § 452.139(2).
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ity.2 5 6 Dual agency is permitted with the broker owing the same
duties to each party.257
2. Minimal Provisions
a. Alabama
Alabama added a disclosure provision to its statutes dealing with
the state's real estate commission, applicable to offers to purchase pre-
pared after April 6, 1989.258 This disclosure is nothing more than a
clause stating who the listing and the selling agent represents. The
broker may insert the clause into the offers in handwriting and need
only obtain the initials of the buyer and seller. One potential problem
with the wording of the Alabama statute is that the statute does not
require the broker to include the agency disclosure clause in the exe-
cuted contract. The statute requires disclosure only for offers. The
importance of this distinction has not been raised in any reported
cases, but it seems to present a statute of frauds/merger problem. Ad-
ditionally, the statute does not require an explanation to accompany
the insertion of the disclosure statement.
b. Arkansas
Effective January 1, 1994, licensees must "clearly disclose to all
parties... which party he or she is representing."25 9 The Arkansas
statute empowers the state real estate commission to establish the de-
tails of the disclosure form and penalties. 260 The statute does not
state whether clear disclosure includes an explanation of what is
meant by "representing" nor does the statute state the duties the
agent owes to the principal. This implicates the potential unauthor-
ized practice of law by brokers.
c. Delaware
Section 2929A requires written disclosure to all parties "who the
licensee does not represent but with whom the licensee has substan-
tive contact, such as prospective sellers, lessors, buyers, and les-
sees."26 1 The disclosure must be made "at the first substantive
contact."26
2
256. Id. §§ 452.133, 452.135.
257. Id. § 452.137.
258. ALA. CODE § 34-27-8(c) (Supp. 1994).
259. ARK CODE ANN. § 17-35-108(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
260. Id. § 17-35-108(b).
261. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 2929A(a) (Supp. 1994).




Continuing its legislative tradition of resisting new trends, Loui-
siana is at the opposite extreme of the spectrum in its approach to real
estate agency relationships and the move toward increased disclosure.
Section 37.1467 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes provides, in its
entirety:
A. Notwithstanding the provision of Civil Code Arts. 2985
through 3034 or any other provisions of law, a licensee
engaged in any real estate transaction is the agent or
subagent of the seller unless there is a written agree-
ment to the contrary and that agreement is disclosed to
all parties.
B. Licensees shall provide the parties to a real estate trans-
action with an agency disclosure form.
C. The commission may prescribe such forms as it deems
necessary for the enforcement of this Section. 263
The Louisiana approach is a model of simplicity and preserves the
traditional common law agency and subagency presumption while ad-
ding a disclosure requirement.
e. South Dakota
South Dakota, like Louisiana, presumes that a real estate licen-
see is always an agent of the owner/seller, unless all parties agree
otherwise in writing.264 The disclosure must be given to the party
who is not being represented (usually the buyer) before showing the
property.26 5
f. Other States
The majority of states have not enacted comprehensive new provi-
sions dealing with real estate agency disclosure. Instead, these states
have minimal provisions similar to those above, usually outlined in
the state's administrative code sections addressing real estate com-
missions. In most instances, a statutory written disclosure require-
ment is briefly mentioned in provisions dealing with the various
grounds for revocation or suspension of brokers' licenses. The statutes
do not provide new definitions for terms such as "transaction broker,"
"buyer's broker," or "dual agent," and the form of disclosure is usually
left to the state's real estate commission to prescribe. Furthermore,
the common law of agency is left intact. These states include: Ari-
zona, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Mis-
263. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1467 (West Supp. 1995).




souri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming, and this is also the approach of the District of
Columbia. 26 6 Washington does not have a provision expressly dealing
with disclosure of agency, but the state statute includes a provision
requiring disclosure when a broker charges or accepts compensation
from more than one party in a transaction.2 67
New Mexico's statute does not specifically mention agency disclo-
sure, but, arguably, agency disclosure is covered by provisions dealing
with "substantial misrepresentation" or "any other conduct ... that
constitutes or demonstrates bad faith, incompetency, untrustworthi-
ness, impropriety, fraud, dishonesty, negligence[,] or any unlawful
act."2 68 The same may be said of Idaho and Montana.2 69 Connecticut
266. See AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2153(A)(2) (Supp. 1994); HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 467-14(4), (12) (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3062(14)-(16) (1994). Section 58-
3062(14)-(16) provides that disclosure may be oral or in writing at the outset, but must
be reduced to writing as part of any sales contract or lot reservation agreement. Id.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324,160(1)(e) (Baldwin 1994); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112,
§ 87AAA(c) (West 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-35-21(e) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 339.100(6) (Vernon 1995); NEV. REv. STAT. § 645.630(3) (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 331-A:26 (XII) (Supp. 1994); N.J. REv. STAT. § 45:15-17(b), (i) (West 1995).
Brokers in New Jersey have been using a wide variety of disclosure forms under
which buyers waive fiduciary duties. The New Jersey Real Estate Commission estab-
lished a task force in 1994 to study the use and validity of such waiver forms and
whether or not they are understood by consumers. The Commission proposed an
amendment to the New Jersey Administrative Code to include an approved disclosure
form with definitions of four forms of agency: seller's agent, buyer's agent, dual agent,
and nonagent. See Pryor, supra note 56, at 35. Additionally, section 11:5-1.23(a) and
(b) of the New Jersey Administrative Code already requires real estate licensees who
represent buyers to disclose to the seller and the seller's broker that they are acting as a
"buyer-broker" early in the transaction, and in any event no later than when the
purchase contract is executed. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 5-1.23 (1994). Section 5-
1.38(a), which was enacted on June 1, 1992, permits disclosed dual agency for in-house
sales, but prohibits receipt of compensation from both the buyer and the seller. Id. § 5-
1.38(a).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-6(a)(4) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23-11.1(1)(d) (1993);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4735.18(A)(4) (Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT., tit. 59, § 858-312(3)
(West 1989 Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-57-170(A)(5), (17) (Law. Co-op. 1986
Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-11(4) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2296(a)(11)
(1989). Vermont's statute § 2296(a)(11) only requires disclosure to the buyer of "the
existence of an agency relationship between the licensee and the seller." Id.
W. VA. CODE §§ 47-12-11(6), (9), (10), 47-12-17(d) (1995); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-28-111
(xviii), (xxiv) (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(4) (1990).
267. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.85.230 (13) (West Supp. 1995).
268. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-29-12 (A), (K) (Michie 1993).
269. IDAHO CODE § 54-2040 (i) (1994 Supp. 1995) (allowing the state's real estate
commission to revoke or suspend a broker's license for "any conduct.., which consti-
tutes dishonest or dishonorable dealings"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-321 (c) (1993) (al-




enacted a specific statutory section requiring disclosure, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1995.270
In 1990, Alaska enacted a similar provision requiring written dis-
closure at the time the agent begins "to provide specific assistance."27 1
A broker must obtain a signed acknowledgement from the purchaser,
and the agency disclosure must be reiterated in the purchase agree-
ment.2 72 Buyers' brokers must provide the same disclosure to the
seller and must also disclose to all parties whether any part of the
commission is to be paid by any source other than the buyer.2 73 Dual
agency is permitted only if both parties consent in writing.2 74 If any
changes in agency occur, the broker must make new disclosures and
obtain written acknowledgements from all parties. 275
Tennessee enacted a statute in 1994 requiring that real estate
licensees inform the party represented (either seller or buyer) of the
party's "rights and obligations" and specifically states that no further
duty is imposed; Virginia enacted a similar statute.2 76 Iowa added a
section to its statutes requiring that the state's real estate commission
"adopt rules requiring that each real estate broker or salesperson in a
real estate transaction disclose in writing the broker's or salesperson's
agency relationship with the buyer or seller in the transaction."27 7
Texas enacted a penalty section applicable when a licensee fails to
properly disclose which party the licensee represents or from whom
the licensee will receive the commission.2 78 A broker may act as a
dual agent provided the broker makes the prescribed disclosure which
includes the broker's duties and obligations when acting as a dual
agent.2 79 Pennsylvania requires disclosure of agency at the initial
interview. 28
0
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE VARIOUS LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The new laws attempt to clarify the actual broker-client relation-
ship at least in part by requiring that brokers disclose the nature of
270. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-325d (West Supp. 1995).
271. ALAsKA STAT. § 08.88.396 (a)(1) (1991).
272. Id. § 08.88.396(a)(2).
273. Id. § 08.88.396(b).
274. Id. § 08.88.396(c).
275. Id. § 08.88.396(d).
276. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 66-5-206 (Supp. 1994). Again, informing a person about
his legal rights and obligations is within the scope of a lawyer's duties, making such
explanations by brokers an unauthorized practice of law. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-523
(Michie 1994).
277. IowA CODE ANN. § 543B.55 (West Supp. 1995).
278. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a § 15 (a)(6)(D) (West Supp. 1995).
279. Id. § 15C.
280. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 455.607-608 (1968 Supp. 1995).
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the relationship. However, disclosing this information presents new
problems and does not effectively resolve old ones.2s1 Buyers and sell-
ers still have the natural tendency to feel that brokers owe them undi-
vided loyalty.28 2  Initial disclosure may provide momentary
illumination for buyers and sellers, but, to be fully effective, brokers
will need to remind consumers of the consumers' status throughout
the transaction, especially when the broker massages them with
friendliness and salesmanship. Additionally, although brokers are al-
lowed to perform certain legal tasks incident to their business without
incurring liability for the unauthorized practice of law, the new disclo-
sure requirements arguably exceed the scope of brokers' permissible
conduct. 28 3
A. MISCONCEPTIONS WILL EXIST DESPITE DISCLOSURE
The traditional relationship of a selling agent as a subagent of the
listing broker contradicts a buyer's reasonable expectation. A selling
agent may comply with the new laws by disclosing to prospective buy-
ers at the outset that the selling agent's loyalties, under a traditional
subagency, are with the seller. It is impossible, however, for a selling
agent to deal effectively with buyers without asking the buyer for sen-
sitive personal information. The very nature of this situation leads
the buyer to feel that a close personal relationship is being created.
The buyer does not expect that the broker will disclose such personal
information to his or her adversary, the seller.
Brokers have legitimate reasons for seeking this personal infor-
mation. Brokers do not want to waste their time and efforts, nor the
281. The new disclosure laws have created uncertainty not only on the part of con-
sumers, but also on the part of real estate brokers. John Sable, a lawyer who represents
Connecticut Prudential Real Estate, commented: "In purely theoretical terms, [the new
disclosure requirements are] a great thing... But in practice, it is very difficult to do...
Early disclosure will 'only expose brokers to more claims of undisclosed dual agency,
because the probability of dual agency is so high." William Hathaway, New Law Seeks
To End Confusion Over Status of Real Estate Agents: Who's the Boss?, Th HAiRTORD
CotRANer, Dec. 11, 1994, at J1 [hereinafter Hathaway] (discussing concerns among real
estate brokers regarding their duties under the new disclosure law). See Terry Sheri-
dan, Law to Clarify Real Estate Agents' Roles Muddies the Waters, TuE DAILY BusmiEss
REviaw-BRowARD CoUNTY FLORIDA, April 28, 1995, at A6.
282. An often cited 1983 Federal Trade Commission survey revealed that seventy-
two percent of home buyers believed that the selling/cooperating broker they dealt with
in a purchase transaction was their agent. See Pryor, supra note 56, at 35. Even in
transactions where the buyers dealt directly with the listing agent, thirty-one percent
believed that the listing agent was working for them. Id. Although the new disclosure
laws helped to alleviate this confusion, a 1993 Gallup Poll revealed that a sizeable
number of consumers were still confused about whom a broker represented: thirty-five
percent of the home buyers surveyed either did not understand or were not advised of
whom the agent they dealt with represented. Id.
283. One example of a legal task incident to a broker's business is the filling in the
blanks in form sales contracts.
1995]
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time and efforts of the buyers or sellers, by showing properties to a
person who is unable or unlikely to buy. In order to avoid this situa-
tion, brokers prequalify buyers; that is, brokers interview buyers
about their finances, their family situation, their needs, their desires,
their proposed timetable, and their likes and dislikes. If the buyer
reveals this information, the selling agent, who is a subagent, is obli-
gated to inform the listing agent and the seller. The seller may then
use this information in both pre- and post-contract negotiations. The
disclosure laws, which require selling agents to advise the prospective
buyers of this consequence, would make buyers resist revealing such
information. This disclosure would likely prevent the buyer from
trusting the selling agent and thus would present difficulties for the
selling agent in effectuating a sale. Disclosure does not provide effec-
tive protection to the parties and has the potential to significantly in-
terfere with current marketing procedures.
Giving a potential customer a disclosure form prepared by a law-
yer or by a government agency is ineffective. Probably only a few cus-
tomers will read the form, and, of those, fewer will understand it.
Most recipients will ask: "What's this?" or "What does it mean?" Be-
cause these statutes incorporate the concept of agency, a good answer
would provide a short course in agency law. But how can state legisla-
tures expect brokers to teach an agency course to members of the gen-
eral public in a short interview while trying to win the business of the
questioner?284 They cannot. Legislatures that mandate broker disclo-
sure of the agency relationships ignore reality. If brokers attempt dis-
closure, customers will probably just ignore the information,
regarding the disclosure as one more meaningless formality, similar to
suggestions that the customer seek legal advice before signing any-
thing. Customers may develop a distrust of brokers who seem to be
trying to protect themselves, and, thus, the effectiveness of the broker
is undermined. However, requiring brokers to hand a disclosure docu-
ment to customers while refusing to explain the document would be
worse. Aggravated customers will feel like they have fallen down the
rabbit hole if they are handed a page that the broker cannot or will not
explain. The brokers act of disclosure has not accomplished anything
positive.
A broker who attempts to disclose that the broker is acting as a
dual agent must overcome an even greater obstacle. The broker must
disclose to both parties that the broker's loyalties to each are limited.
It will be very difficult for the parties to understand or emotionally
accept that the person with whom they have worked so closely owes
284. In effect, agency disclosure will become meaningless paperwork, in a league
with Truth-in-Lending or Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act disclosures.
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loyalties to the other side in the transaction. This will be particularly
difficult for the seller who is, at least facially, paying the entire com-
mission. Dual agent representation also undermines the broker's jus-
tification in asking for the same amount of commission as is received
by a broker who owes full loyalty to the seller.28 5 Dual agency creates
an inherent conflict of interest that should not be waivable through
disclosure. By analogy, some conflicts of interest encountered by at-
torneys may not be waived by consent and require the attorney to
withdraw from representation. The legal profession's ethical rules
would require the attorney to withdraw under conflict situations simi-
lar to those posed by dual agency. The ethical standards require with-
drawal despite the attorney's training and ability to fully explain
conflicts of interest and their consequences. 28 6 No justification exists
to permit brokers to undertake dual agency when these brokers are
not qualified to explain or understand the legal ramifications of con-
flicts of interest.
The "designated agent" approach used by Illinois, Maine, and
other jurisdictions attempts to solve the problem by creating the ap-
pearance that the buyer and seller are represented by different bro-
kers. When a listing broker finds a potential buyer who wants to bid
on the broker's own listing, another broker in the office is then desig-
nated to work with the buyer. This designation comes too late. The
listing broker already has acquired confidential information and has
developed a relationship with the buyer. A buyer who is shunted off to
the listing broker's associate is very likely to feel abused because the
buyer now sees one who was formerly the buyer's confidante and advi-
sor on the other side of the transaction. Conversely, the seller will feel
short-changed because the listing broker cannot fully advise the seller
during negotiations due to the previously received confidential infor-
mation. After all, the seller is still paying the full commission. If the
transaction goes sour for any reason, both buyer and seller are likely
to focus their anger and disappointment on the "disloyal" broker even
285. See Hathaway, supra note 281, at J1 (discussing the impact of Connecticut's
new disclosure law). The article raises the issue of how long sellers will continue to pay
six percent commissions for selling their houses if they receive less representation. Id.
286. See, e.g., Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 467 (N.J. 1993) (holding that a
lawyer may not represent both the buyer and the seller in a "complex commercial real
estate transaction" even if both the buyer and the seller give their "informed consent").
Although the case may be distinguished because it involved a commercial real estate
transaction, the decision is notable because the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
even a lawyer who is competent and qualified to explain the legal implications of dual
agency cannot undertake such representation. Baldasarre, 625 A.2d at 467. Regardless
of whether the transaction involves residential or commercial property, the "disclosed
dual agency" practiced by real estate brokers should be even less permissible. Most
brokers generally possess only a high school diploma and most are only required to
attend a short real estate course.
1995]
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if that person is entirely innocent of wrongdoing. The "designated
agent" concept is an unrealistic attempt to avoid dual agency, because
the listing broker has been compromised and thereafter has at least
some responsibility to both parties. Moreover, the minimal separation
between the brokers would probably not pass muster under legal pro-
fessional responsibility analysis.287
Brokers who act as facilitators or independent contractors and
disclose this relationship to both parties will have an even tougher
time convincing the parties that the broker's services merit a full com-
mission. If the party understands the difference, neither party will
want to pay the same commission for a broker who owes them no loy-
alty when, for the same cost, they can hire a broker to act as their
fiduciary. The mere fact that brokers acting as independent contrac-
tors have been able to obtain business is a sign that consumers do not
know what they are entitled to in exchange for paying a commission.
Consumer groups should educate the public in this area so that people
receive the most for their money. The market forces created by edu-
cated consumers would probably cause the extinction of the "in-
dependent contractor" concept by exposing this concept as an attempt
by brokers to short-change their clients.
In many states, the new disclosure laws do not mention any abro-
gation of common law agency with its accompanying fiduciary duties.
As evidenced by the two Edina Realty cases, this flaw provides con-
sumers with potential remedies when they feel dissatisfied with a bro-
ker's representation. Even in the few states which abrogated common
law agency as applied to brokers, the brokers might not fully complete
the statutory disclosure requirements or the broker might complete
the disclosure in a manner which has no meaningful effect on the buy-
ers' or sellers' expectations. Where the initial disclosure was suffi-
cient, the relationship may change later in the transaction due to the
type of property, the involvement of other parties, the addition of new
parties or brokers, or the relationships of others involved. These
changes may necessitate further disclosures to modify' the customers'
expectations and satisfy the law. Brokers could be held liable for fail-
ing to make further disclosures when changes occur.288 These modifi-
287. Rules of imputed disqualification of other firm members would likely apply to
such a situation. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a)(1983).
*288. An attorney for a major real estate firm in Connecticut provided the following
example:
An agent for, say, [X firm], agrees to represent a buyer as a buyer agent. As
soon as that buyer is shown a[n] [X firm] listing, that relationship must change
to what is known as "dual agency," in which certain information such as negoti-
ating position can be withheld from both buyer and seller. The listing company
must get both the seller and buyer to agree in writing to the new relationship
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cations have complicated business for brokers and have exposed them
to unreasonable potential risks.
B. DISCLOSURE MAY CONSTITUTE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Disclosure requirements that essentially mandate defining the
legal relationships created as well as the consequences that follow
may force brokers into committing the unauthorized practice of law.
The purpose of the rule against unauthorized practice is to protect the
public. Brokers, however, are permitted to execute purchase contracts
by using forms approved by their state's bar.289 The traditional ra-
tionale allowing brokers this ability is that "[1]egal consequences be-
come irrevocable and binding at the time a real estate transaction is
closed, as distinguished from the execution of the contract of sale by
the parties." 290 The real reason for permitting brokers to perform this
essentially legal function is probably that the practice has been ac-
cepted for too long to change in the face of consumer demand.
... Then the problem can get more complicated when another buyer turns up
escorted by any [X firm] agent, who is acting in a more traditional role of sub-
agent for the seller. Then that agent must also change his or her relationship
with the seller to match [X firm's] new role as dual agent. The more houses
a[n] [X firm] buyer agent shows, the more times the company must disclose and
change relationships with sellers...
See Hathaway, supra note 281, at J1 (interviewing John Sable, counsel for Connecticut
Prudential Real Estate).
289. Brokers are usually allowed to complete such form contracts if they meet the
so-called "incident to business" test which provides in relevant part: 1) the act must be
an essential and inherent part of the business enterprise, the existence of
which is dictated and relied upon by the public to fulfill a vital need, and the
operation of which would be disabled and its value to society destroyed if the
acts were prohibited; and 2) such acts have not injured the public, with the
future potential of injury being purely speculative in nature.
BuRKE, supra note 1, § 13.1.2 at 13:9-10 (citing Baier, The Developing Principles in the
Law of Unauthorized Practice re Real Estate Brokers, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 127, 127-28
(1964)). Whether or not the drafting of standard form contracts constitutes the unau-
thorized practice of law is a case-by-case, fact-specific determination. Id. § 13.1.1 at
13:6-7, n.17 (citing Hagan & Van Camp P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730
(Wash. 1981) (reopening the issue to discussion)).
290. Id. at 13:6. Some courts have also held that it is in the public's interest to allow
brokers to perform these arguably legal services, claiming that referring such matters
to attorneys will cost. the consumers more money, that it is more convenient to allow
brokers to perform such tasks, and that the public has the right to use the "full range of
services that brokers and salespersons can provide." Id. § 13.1.2 at 13:15 (citing Cultum
v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1985)). This rationale presup-
poses that the function of lawyers is only corrective rather than preventative.
Still other jurisdictions apply a "substantial interest" test to determine whether a
broker's preparation of certain legal documents constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law. The test establishes a boundary, permitting brokers to prepare legal documents
necessary for the broker to complete his services and become entitled to his commission,
but not after that point. Thus, because a listing broker becomes entitled to his commis-
sion when he produces a ready, willing and able buyer, he can prepare all documents
necessary to meet that goal, but cannot prepare conveyancing documents because they
are not necessary for him to earn his commission. Id. § 13.1.3 at 13:21.
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The traditional rationale, however, does not justify the new bro-
kers' disclosure laws. These disclosures are intended to fix and define
the legal rights of the parties. Article 17 of NAR's Code of Ethics and
Standards of Practice states that "[r]ealtors shall not engage in activi-
ties that constitute the unauthorized practice of law and shall recom-
mend that legal counsel be obtained when the interest of any party to
the transaction requires it." 29 1 Additionally, Statement of Principles
propounded jointly by the American Bar Association and NAR state
that:
[t]he Realtor shall not practice law or give legal advice di-
rectly or indirectly; he shall not act as a public conveyancer,
nor give advice or opinions as to the legal effect of legal in-
struments, nor give opinions concerning the validity of title to
real estate, and he shall not prevent or discourage any party
to a real estate transaction from employing the services of a
lawyer.... The Realtor shall not undertake to draw or pre-
pare documents fixing and defining the legal rights of parties
to a transaction. 292
As far as contract preparation, brokers and attorneys reached a
compromise whereby the form contracts brokers use are drafted and
approved by the bar. However, the issue with regard to agency disclo-
sures is not so simple. While brokers should not be held liable for per-
forming a statutory mandate, the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law exists to protect the public. Even if the
respective states' bars permit the use of lawyer-prepared disclosure
forms, the broker may not accompany the disclosure with a competent
explanation to the parties of their rights and duties without legal
training.
Many of the jurisdictions include a provision in their disclosure
statutes requiring brokers to advise consumers that they should seek
the advice of a lawyer. This requirement may be sufficient to protect
the public, but it is sincerely doubted. Perhaps expanding broker edu-
cation to provide significant background in agency law would be suffi-
cient to prepare brokers for this task. However, it should be noted this
disclosure requirement places a tremendous burden on brokers with-
out producing any public benefit because of the subject matter of the
disclosure. Statutes that focus on disclosing legal relationships re-
quire an understanding of the relationships and their ramifications
which the public does not possess. The proposal in the next section
changes the focus to simple concepts which the public will be able to
understand.
291. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHics AND STANDARDS OF PRAC-
TICE, Art. 17 (1994).
292. See BumcE, supra note 1, § 13.2.1 at 13:25-26.
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VII. THE REALISTIC SOLUTION: A STATUTORY
BROKERAGE RELATIONSHIP
This proposal is designed to facilitate the real estate brokerage
business by imposing simple, easy to understand duties on the broker
while giving sellers and buyers the service they have a reasonable
right to expect. Sellers want their property marketed to the widest
audience. Brokers reach potential buyers primarily through the MLS
network. Sellers do not want to waste the time and effort involved in
showing the property to those who are unlikely or unable to buy. Bro-
kers satisfy this need by screening and prequalifying buyers before
showing properties. The proposed statute responds by requiring the
listing broker to make a reasonable good faith effort to help the seller
market the property. Questions of whether certain efforts meet the
standard could be answered by custom in the trade, case law, and/or
rules promulgated by the appropriate agency.
Buyers want to find and buy a suitable property with minimum
time and effort but at the best price and terms. Buyers often need
assistance in obtaining financing and in having the property in-
spected. The inspection process insures that the condition of the prop-
erty is sound and that any problems, defects, and repair needs are
discovered, disclosed, and resolved before buying. Buyers often rely
on the broker to help find the appropriate professional, including a
lawyer, to handle the closing. Buyers want to know about the market
trends in the area, the characteristics of the neighborhood in which a
property is located, and current loan, tax, insurance, and community
association rates. The buyer usually requires more services from a
broker than the seller, and yet current agency law deems the broker to
represent the seller. This proposal responds to these needs by requir-
ing brokers to make a reasonable good faith effort to locate appropri-
ate and properties and service providers for potential buyers.
The brokers' interests are simple. The broker wants to earn a
commission by selling property. Brokers want to make as many sales
as possible, at good commission rates, without incurring liability. Bro-
kers want to provide professional service in order to satisfy customers,
increase referrals, improve their reputation, and attract clients. The
brokers sell their ability to facilitate the transaction by utilizing their
expertise, their knowledge of the real estate market, their marketing
talents, and their professional contacts.293
293. Brokers do have a very ligitimate function and area of expertise. Talents
within their province include the following: sales of all types of residential, commercial,
industrial, income-producing, agricultural and other types of real property; property
management, a growing business in Florida, with its large number of condominiums
and community associations; market analysis and property valuation; facilitation of fi-
1995]
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As seen above, the agency characterizations and recent statutory
reactions to the common law's inadequacies do not satisfy the sellers',
buyers', or brokers' needs or expectations. The current variations
merely confuse everyone. The solution lies in designing a statute that,
in simple terms, mandates a role for real estate brokers. The statute
should simply specify what the broker must and must not do in terms
that are both consistent with the realistic expectations of the parties
and allow the real estate business to proceed with as little disruption
as possible. The statute should provide that real estate brokers will:
(1) act in good faith at all times; (2) make reasonable efforts to help
sellers market properties listed with them; (3) make reasonable efforts
to locate appropriate properties and service providers for potential
buyers with whom they are working; (4) disclose to both sellers and
potential buyers all information concerning the property that the bro-
ker has or should have; and (5) prohibit disclosure of personal infor-
mation about the sellers or potential buyers to any person unless
given specific authorization by the subject of the information. 294 Vio-
lation of these rules should expressly become both a statutory tort,
giving rise to a private cause of action for damages suffered, and a
basis for discipline by the brokers' licensing authority.
These rules should supersede all previous inconsistent law, in-
cluding common law and earlier statutes and may not be varied by
agreement. These rules should apply uniformly to listing agent, sell-
ing agent, or buyers agent. These rules do not vary when the listing
agent has also produced the buyer, and they do not prevent brokers
from entering into a variety of different relationships with buyers and/
or sellers to the extent those relationships are inconsistent with the
rules.
This solution satisfies the reasonable needs and expectations of
each party. Sellers want a sale at the best price to obtain the maxi-
mum return on their investment and usually want a quick sale. Sell-
nancing; property inspection and identification of repair needs; and assistance in land
development, subdividing, and marketing. See generally, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COM-
MISSION HANDBOOK, Chap. 2 § 1 at 2-1-4 (1993).
294. The current prohibition against a nonlawyer performing legal services such as
giving advice to any person should, of course, be continued. Brokers are often called
upon to give legal advice, e.g., What does this contract term mean? Can we insert a
clause which allows me to do this? What do I have to do now? Can they sue me if I do
this? Can I make them do that? Due to experience, brokers may feel competent to give
the advice, but it is a temptation that the wise broker carefully avoids. The threat of
being accused of practicing law without a license is minor compared to the potential
liability to a customer who claims to have been given advice, particularly bad advice.
But the parties may be disappointed, or even angry, if the broker will not answer these
questions. Nonlawyers are currently prohibited from giving legal advice in every state,
although they are generally allowed to fill in form contracts. The ideal system would
protect the brokers from liability for the unauthorized practice of law.
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ers expect the broker will help find buyers, obtain a signed contract,
and close the transaction. The broker has the expertise to provide
marketing advice, a listing price, and what inexpensive fix-ups would
help most in producing a quick sale.
Requiring the full disclosure of all information concerning the
property is a logical expansion of the current trend that requires the
seller to make full disclosure. 295 Requiring the broker to reveal any
information that the broker has, or should have, would allow the par-
ties to receive maximum benefit from the broker's real estate exper-
tise.2 96 This "requirement" provides significant relief for the broker
because it relieves the broker of any responsibility to keep certain in-
formation secret. It also simplifies things for the broker because there
is only one simple standard to apply. When it comes to information
about the property, disclose everything to the interested parties. This
standard also has tremendous advantages for the buyer and the seller.
Each will be dealing from a position of knowledge about the property.
The standard will eliminate subsequent surprises resulting in the
elimination of most causes of buyer's or seller's remorse. Full disclo-
sure will create a relaxed atmosphere where the parties will emerge
satisfied with the transaction. Neither the buyer nor the seller will
have to fear that they might later discover that they have been treated
unfairly.
On the other hand, brokers should have a professional duty not to
reveal personal matters about one party to another. This prohibition
should apply to any broker, regardless of whether the broker is char-
acterized as a listing broker, a "seller's broker," a cooperating broker,
or any other "broker" category. This prohibition performs a function
similar to requiring full disclosure about the property; it creates an
atmosphere in which neither party will feel used. This creates a clear
line that a broker may not cross without express permission, making
it easy for brokers and principals alike to understand what topics are
off limits. Questions about the other party's motivations or levels of
desperation would simply be off limits. In this way, the parties can
deal with each other in light of the information regarding the property
295. An interesting question is whether "all information about the property" should
include the substance of all offers or counter offers which are currently before the seller.
Certainly, a broker should have a duty to deliver any offer received to. the seller. But
should the broker reveal to other potential buyers that a certain offer is currently before
the seller? That certainly would be helpful information to the potential buyer in decid-
ing whether to make an offer and at what terms. Likewise, such openness might stimu-
late competition resulting in sales at better prices and, perhaps, at greater speed. See
Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation, 44
DEPAuL L. REv. 381 (1995).
296. Such knowledge would include the property's value, condition or defects, and
suitability for a particular use.
1995]
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rather than the positions of those involved. Negotiations would center
on the property and its value, not on the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the parties. 297 This would mean brokers might have to give
up some traditional sales tools, including "Desperate Seller" or "Moti-
vated Seller" signs or announcements. This is a minimal loss because
the tool is not necessarily lost completely. The prohibition does not
prevent a broker from delivering communications that one party
wants delivered to the other. The prohibition merely prohibits the
broker from becoming an unauthorized source of personal information
that becomes a factor in the transaction. The prohibition against re-
vealing personal information would elevate the brokerage profession
and the real estate sales process by eliminating some of the distasteful
gamesmanship often utilized. 298
By focusing on the services and information a broker provides,
this proposal clarifies the broker's role. It also eliminates the prime
source of conflict of interest charges. Customers would probably be
satisfied more often and, consequently, would be more willing to pay
the full commission without grumbling. Moreover, life would be far
simpler for brokers who have one simple set of rules to follow in every
transaction, regardless of their role in the transaction. Brokers would
no longer be faced with a confusing system.
This proposal empowers customers by providing them with dual
remedies for any violation of these rules. Customers could sue the vio-
lators directly for any injury suffered from the violation, and they
could file complaints with the governmental authority that licenses
brokers. This should reduce litigation, not encourage it, because the
issues would be simple: Did the broker violate the statutory duty? Did
the violation cause injury? This proposal will simplify and clarify real
estate brokerage law. It will protect the public and brokers by provid-
297. This should also eliminate the often perplexing questions about when a broker
should reveal to a party any nonbrokerage relationship he or she has with the other
party. One example, of a nonbrokerage relationship occurs when a potential buyer uses
a boyfriend or girlfriend who is a broker to find a house. Under the traditional sub-
agency scenario, the selling broker should, at the very least, promptly reveal that rela-
tionship to the listing broker and the seller. If the seller objects, the broker should
probably withdraw due to the inherent conflict of interest. Even in a dual agency situa-
tion, the personal relationship which previously existed creates significant concern and
certainly requires disclosure. However, under these proposed rules, that previous rela-
tionship is irrelevant unless the relationship is with the listing broker. Then the seller
might have reason to suspect that the professional advice of the broker in setting the
listing price may have been tainted by the plan to sell to that buyer at a reduced price.
In such a case, the listing broker must communicate personal information about him or
herself.
298. Perhaps this would not elevate the brokerage profession to the level of the
priesthood with its sanctity of the confessional, but it certainly would improve the pub-
lic's perception of brokers if it became widely known that personal information given
brokers would not and could not be divulged without risking a penalty or liability.
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ing simple understandable rules and remedies for rule violation while
insuring that valuable brokerage services will continue to be readily
available. This proposal will also allow continued development and
expansion of brokerage services.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The traditional formulations for the relationships that might exist
between real estate brokers, sellers, and buyers are inadequate for the
realities of modern real estate transactions. Attempts to recast these
relationships by using labels like "designated agent," "dual agent," or
"facilitator" have exacerbated the problems. The solution is to elimi-
nate the multiple possibilities and simplify the relationships by im-
posing a simple statutory list of what the broker must and must not
do. This will best protect the seller, the buyer, and the broker.
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IX. APPENDIX - A
SALIENT ELEMENTS OF STATE REAL ESTATE
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A. Contains a comprehensive definition section including a distinction between
"dual agent," "buyer," and "listing agent."
B. Contains limited definitions of the various brokerage relationships.
C. Defines the broker's duties and responsibilities.
D. Allows the parties to modify by contract the duties and responsibilities of the
broker.
E. Provides the means to limit the broker's fiduciary duties, such as through the
creation of the designation of limited agent, etc.
F. Provides the means to avoid the creation of a dual agency.
G. Allows a broker to act as a dual agent.
H. Presumes the broker is always the agent of the owner/seller unless otherwise
contracted.
I. Requires only limited, if any, disclosure of agency relationships to the parties.
J. Requires the use of separate comprehensive buyer and seller disclosure forms.
K. Prescribes use of statutory disclosure forms.
L. Disclosure provisions, if any, are prescribed by the state's real estate commission.
M. Duty to disclose arises before contract is executed.
N. Duty to disclose arises at first substantive contact.
0. Requires brokers to advise client that the disclosures have legal consequences.
P. Source of compensation does not determine or create an agency relationship.
Q. Sharing the commission does not necessarily create a sub-agency relationship.
R. Preserves the common law agency/fiduciary duties and remedies.
S. Implies an abrogation of common law fiduciary duties.
T. Abrogates common law fiduciary duties.
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IX. APPENDIX - B
TYPICAL DISCLOSURE FORMS
1. California's Disclosure Form
DISCLOSURE REGARDING REAL
ESTATE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
(As required by the Civil Code)
When you enter into a discussion
with a real estate agent regarding a real
estate transaction, you should from the
outset understand what type of agency re-
lationship or representation you wish to
have with the agent in the transaction.
SELLER'S AGENT
A Seller's agent under a listing agree-
ment with the Seller acts as the agent for
the Seller only. A Seller's agent or a sub-
agent of that agent has the following af-
firmative obligations:
To the Seller:
(a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, in-
tegrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings
with the Seller.
To the Buyer and the Seller:
(a) Diligent exercise of reasonable
skill and care in performance of the
agent's duties.
(b) A duty of honest and fair dealing
and good faith.
(c) A duty to disclose all facts known
to the agent materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property that are not
known to, or within the diligent attention
and observation of, the parties.
An agent is not obligated to reveal to
either party any confidential information
obtained from the other party which does
not involve the affirmative duties set forth
above.
BUYER'S AGENT
A selling agent can, with a Buyer's
consent, agree to act as agent for the
Buyer only. In these situations, the agent
is not the Seller's agent, even if by agree-
ment the agent may receive compensation
for services rendered, either in full or in
part from the Seller. An agent acting only
for a Buyer has the following affirmative
obligations:
To the Buyer:
(a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, in-
tegrity, honesty, and loyalty in dealings
with the Buyer.
To the Buyer and the Seller:
(a) Diligent exercise of reasonable
skill and care in performance of the
agent's duties.
(b) A duty of honest and fair dealing
and good faith.
(c) A duty to disclose all facts known
to the agent materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property that are not
known to, or within the diligent attention
and observation of, the parties. An agent
is not obligated to reveal to either party
any confidential information obtained
from the other party which does not in-




A real estate agent, either acting di-
rectly or through one or more associate
licensees, can legally be the agent of both
the Seller and the Buyer in a transaction,
but only with the knowledge and consent
of both the Seller and the Buyer.
In a dual agency situation, the agent
has the following affirmative obligations
to both the Seller and the Buyer:
(a) A fiduciary duty of utmost care, in-
tegrity, honesty and loyalty in the deal-
ings with either Seller or the Buyer.
(b) Other duties to the Seller and the
Buyer as stated above in their respective
sections.
In representing both Seller and
Buyer, the agent may not, without the ex-
press permission of the respective party,
disclose to the other party that the Seller
will accept a price less than the listing
price or that the Buyer will pay a price
greater than the price offered.
The above duties of the agent in a real
estate transaction do not relieve a Seller
or Buyer from the responsibility to protect
their own interests. You should carefully
read all agreements to assure that they
adequately express your understanding of
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the transaction. A real estate agent is a
person qualified to advise about real es-
tate. If legal or tax advice is desired, con-
sult a competent professional.
Throughout your real property trans-
action you may receive more than one dis-
closure form, depending upon the number
of agents assisting in the transaction.
The law requires each agent with whom
you have more than a casual relationship
to present you with this disclosure form.
You should read its contents each time it
is presented to you, considering the rela-
tionship between you and the real estate
agent in your specific transaction.
This disclosure form includes the pro-
visions of Article 2.5 (commencing with
Section 2373) of Chapter 2 of Title 9 of
Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code set









2. Minnesota's Disclosure Form
82.197. Disclosure requirements
Subdivision 1. Agency disclosure.
The listing agreement or a buyer's broker
agreement must include a clear and com-
plete explanation of how the broker will
represent the interests of the seller or
buyer, and, if the broker represents both
sellers and buyers, state how that repre-
sentation would be altered in a dual
agency situation, and require the seller or
buyer to choose whether to authorize the
broker to initiate any transaction which
would give rise to dual agency. Disclosure
to a customer of a licensee's agency rela-
tionship with other parties must be made
at a time and in a manner sufficient to
protect the customer's bargaining
position.
Subd. 2. Creation of dual agency. If
circumstances create a dual agency situa-
tion, the broker must make full disclosure
to all parties to the transaction as to the
change in relationship of the parties to the
broker due to dual agency. A broker, hav-
ing made full disclosure, must obtain the
consent of all parties to these circum-
stances before accepting the dual agency.
Subd. 3. Scope and effect. The require-
ments for disclosure of agency relation-
ships set forth in this chapter are
intended only to establish a minimum
standard for regulatory purposes, and are
not intended to abrogate common law.
Subd. 4. Agency disclosure forms. (a)
Disclosures of agency relationships shall
be made in substantially the form set
forth in paragraphs (b) to (e):
(b) ADDENDUM TO LISTING
AGREEMENT
.... (Broker).... will be representing you
as your broker in the sale of your property
located at ...................... This relationship
is called an agency. As your agent,
.... (Broker).... owes you the duties of loy-
alty, obedience, disclosure, confidentiality,
reasonable care and diligence, and full ac-
counting. However .... (Broker).... also
represents buyers looking for properties.
If a buyer represented by .... (Broker)....
becomes interested in your property, a
dual agency will be created. This means
that .... (Broker).... will owe the same du-
ties to the buyer that we owe to you. This
conflict of interest will prohibit .... (Bro-
ker).... from advocating exclusively on
your behalf when attempting to effect the
sale of your property. Dual agency will
limit the level of representation which
.... (Broker).... can provide.
If a dual agency should arise, you will
need to agree that confidential informa-
tion about price, terms, and motivation
will still be kept confidential unless you
instruct .... (Broker).... in writing to dis-
close specific information about you or
your property. All other information will
be shared. Regardless of whether a dual
agency occurs .... (Broker).... must disclose
to the buyer any material facts of which
.... (Broker).... is aware that may adversely
and significantly affect the buyer's use or
enjoyment of the property. In addition,
.... (Broker).... must disclose to both par-
ties any information of which .... (Bro-
ker).... is aware that a party will not
perform in accordance with the terms of
the purchase agreement or similar writ-
ten agreement to convey real estate.
.... (Broker).... cannot act as a dual
agent unless both you and the buyer agree
to the dual agency after it is disclosed to
you. By agreeing to a possible dual
agency, you will be giving up the right to
exclusive representation in an in-house
transaction. However, if you should de-
cide not to agree to a possible dual agency,
and you want .... (Broker).... to represent
you, you may give up the opportunity to




Having read and understood this in-
formation about dual agency, you now in-
struct .... (Broker).... as follows:
.... Seller agrees to dual agency repre-
sentation and will consider offers made by
buyers represented by ....(Broker) .....
.... Seller does not agree to dual
agency representation and will not con-
sider offers made by buyers represented








(c) ADDENDUM TO BUYER
REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT
.... (Broker).... will be representing you
as your broker to assist you in finding and
purchasing a property. This relationship
is called an agency. As your agent,
.... (Broker).... owes you the duties of loy-
alty, obedience, disclosure, confidentiality,
reasonable care and diligence, and full ac-
counting. However, ....(Broker).... also
represents sellers by listing their property
for sale. If you become interested in a
property listed by .... (Broker)...., a dual
agency will be created. This means that
.... (Broker).... will owe the same duties to
the seller that ....(Broker).... owes to you.
This conflict of interest will prohibit
.... (Broker).... from advocating exclusively
on your behalf when attempting to effect
the purchase of the property. Dual agency
will limit the level of representation
.... (Broker).... can provide.
If a dual agency should arise, you will
need to agree that confidential informa-
tion about price, terms, and motivation
will still be kept confidential unless you
instruct .... (Broker).... in writing to dis-
close specific information about you. All
other information will be shared. Regard-
less of whether a dual agency occurs,
.... (Broker).... must disclose to the buyer
any material facts of which .... (Broker)....
is aware that may adversely and signifi-
cantly affect the buyer's use or enjoyment
of the property. In addition, ....(Broker)....
must disclose to both parties any informa-
tion of which ....(Broker).... is aware that a
party will not perform in accordance with
the terms of the purchase agreement or
similar written agreement to convey real
estate.
.... (Broker).... cannot act as a dual
agent unless both you and the seller agree
to the dual agency after it is disclosed to
you. By agreeing to a possible dual
agency, you will be giving up the right to
exclusive representation in an in-house
transaction. However, if you should de-
cide not to agree to a possible dual agency,
and you want .... (Broker).... to represent
you, you may give up the opportunity to




Having read and understood this in-
formation about dual agency, you now in-
struct ....(Broker).... as follows:
.... Buyer will agree to a dual agency
representation and will consider proper-
ties listed by ....(Broker) .....
.... Buyer will not agree to a dual
agency representation and will not con-






(d) DISCLOSURE TO CUSTOMER
Before .... (Broker).... begins to assist
you in finding and purchasing a property,
we must disclose to you that ....(Broker)....
will be representing the seller in the
transaction.
.... (Broker).... will disclose to you all
material facts about the property of which
.... (Broker).... is aware, that could ad-
versely and significantly affect your use or
enjoyment of the property ..... (Broker)....
will also assist you with the mechanics of
the transaction.
When it comes to the price and terms
of an offer, ....(Broker).... will ask you to
make the decision as to how much to offer
for any property and upon what terms and
conditions .... (Broker).... can explain your
options to you, but the ultimate decision is
yours .... (Broker).... will attempt to show
you properties in the price range and cate-
gory you desire so that you will have infor-
mation on which to base your decision.
.... (Broker).... will present to the seller
any written offer that you ask .... (Bro-
ker).... to present .... (Broker).... asks you
to keep to yourself any information about
the price or terms of your offer, or your
motivation for making an offer, that you
do not want the seller to know .... (Bro-
ker).... would be required, as the seller's
agent, to disclose this information to the
seller. You should carefully consider
sharing any information with .... (Bro-







(e) DISCLOSURE TO BUYER AND
SELLER AT TIME OF OFFER TO
PURCHASE
.... (Broker).... represents the seller at
the property located at
.... (Broker).... also represents a buyer
who offered to purchase the seller's prop-
erty. When .... (Broker).... represents both
the buyer and the seller in a transaction,
a dual agency is created. This means that
.... (Broker).... and its agents owe a fiduci-
ary duty to both buyer and seller. Be-
cause buyer and seller may have
conflicting interests .... (Broker).... and its
agents are prohibited from advocating ex-
clusively for either party.
.... (Broker).... cannot represent both
the buyer and seller in this transaction
unless both the buyer and seller agree to
this dual agency.
Buyer and seller acknowledge and
agree that:
1. Confidential information communi-
cated to .... (Broker).... which regards
price, terms, or motivation to buy or sell
will remain confidential unless buyer or
seller instructs ....(Broker).... in writing to
disclose this information about the buyer
or seller. Other information will be
shared.
2 .... (Broker).... and its salespersons
will disclose to buyer all material facts of
which they are aware which could ad-
versely and significantly affect the buyer's
use or enjoyment of the property or any
intended use of the property of which
.... (Broker).... or its salespersons are
aware (this disclosure is required by law
whether or not a dual agency is involved).
3 .... (Broker).... and its salespersons
will disclose to both parties all informa-
tion of which they are aware that either
party will not perform in accordance with
the terms of the purchase agreement or
other written agreement to convey real es-
tate (this disclosure is required by law
whether or not a dual agency is involved).
4 .... (Broker).... and its salespersons
will not represent the interests of either
party to the detriment of the other.
5. Within the limits of dual agency,
.... (Broker).... and its salespersons will
work diligently to facilitate the mechanics
of the sale.
With the knowledge and understand-
ing of the explanation above, buyer and
seller authorize and instruct ....(Broker)....





Subd. 5. Application. The disclosures
required by subdivision 4 apply only to
residential real property transactions.
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3. New York's Agency Disclosure Form
s 443. Disclosure regarding real estate
agency relationship; form
1. Definitions. As used in this section,
the following terms shall have the follow-
ing meanings:
a. "Agent" means a person who is li-
censed as a real estate broker or real es-
tate sales associate under section 440-a of
this article and is acting in a fiduciary
capacity.
b. "Buyer" means a transferee or
lessee in a residential real property trans-
action and includes a person who executes
an offer to purchase or to lease residential
real property from a seller through an
agent, or who has engaged the services of
an agent with the object of entering into a
residential real property transaction as a
transferee or lessee.
c. "Buyer's agent" means an agent
who contracts to locate residential real
property for a buyer or who finds a buyer
for a property and presents an offer to
purchase to the seller or seller's agent and
negotiates on behalf of the buyer.
d. "Listing agent" means a person
who has entered into a listing agreement
to act as an agent of the seller for
compensation.
e. "Listing agreement" means a con-
tract between an owner or owners of resi-
dential real property and an agent, by
which the agent has been authorized to
sell or lease the residential real property
or to find or obtain a buyer or lessee
therefore.
f. "Residential real property" means
real property improved by a one-to-four
family dwelling used or occupied, or in-
tended to be used or occupied, wholly or
partly, as the home or residence of one or
more persons, but shall not refer to (i) un-
improved real property upon which such
dwellings are to be constructed or (ii) con-
dominium or cooperative apartments in a
building containing more than four units.
g. "Seller" means the transferor or
lessor in a residential real property trans-
action, and includes an owner who lists
residential real property for sale or lease
with an agent, whether or not a transfer
or lease results, or who receives an offer to
purchase or lease residential real
property.
h. "Seller's agent" means a listing
agent who acts alone, or an agent who
acts in cooperation with a listing agent,
acts as a seller's subagent or acts as a bro-
ker's agent to find or obtain a buyer for
residential real property.
2. This section shall apply only to
transactions involving residential real
property.
3. a. A listing agent shall provide the
disclosure form set forth in subdivision
four of this section to a seller prior to en-
tering into a listing agreement with the
seller and shall obtain a signed acknowl-
edgment from the seller, except as pro-
vided in paragraph f of this subdivision.
b. A seller's agent shall provide the
disclosure form set forth in subdivision
four of this section to a buyer or buyer's
agent at the time of the first substantive
contact with the buyer and shall obtain a
signed acknowledgement from the buyer,
except as provided in paragraph f of this
subdivision.
c. A buyer's agent shall provide the
disclosure form to the buyer prior to en-
tering into an agreement to act as the
buyer's agent and shall obtain a signed ac-
knowledgment from the buyer, except as
provided in paragraph f of this subdivi-
sion. A buyer's agent shall provide the
form to the seller or seller's agent at the
time of the first substantive contact with
the seller and shall obtain a signed ac-
knowledgment from the seller or the
seller's listing agent, except as provided in
paragraph f of this subdivision.
d. The parties to a contract of
purchase and sale shall sign the acknowl-
edgment of the parties to the contract. If
attorneys for the buyer and seller arrange
for the preparation and execution of a con-
tract, the real estate licensees are not
responsible for obtaining the acknowl-
edgement of the parties as required by
this paragraph.
e. The agent shall provide to the
buyer or seller a copy of the signed ac-
knowledgment and shall maintain a copy
of the signed acknowledgment for not less
than three years.
f. If the seller or buyer refuses to sign
an acknowledgment of receipt pursuant to
this subdivision, the agent shall set forth
under oath or affirmation a written decla-
ration of the facts of the refusal and shall
maintain a copy of the declaration for not
less than three years.
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Before you enter into a discussion
with a real estate agent regarding a real
estate transaction, you should understand
what type of agency relationship you wish
to have with that agent.
New York State law requires real es-
tate licensees who are acting as agents of
buyers or sellers of property to advise the
potential buyers or sellers with whom
they work of the nature of their agency re-
lationship and the rights and obligations
it creates.
SELLER'S OR LANDLORD'S AGENT
If you are interested in selling or leas-
ing real property, you can engage a real
estate agent as a seller's agent. A seller's
agent, including a listing agent under a
listing agreement with the seller, acts
solely on behalf of the seller. You can au-
thorize a seller's or landlord's agent to do
other things including hire subagents,
broker's agents or work with other agents
such as buyer's agents on a cooperative
basis. A subagent, is one who has agreed
to work with the seller's agent, often
through a multiple listing service. A sub-
agent may work in a different real estate
office.
A seller's agent has, without limita-
tion, the following fiduciary duties to the
seller: reasonable care, undivided loyalty,
confidentiality, full disclosure, obedience
and a duty to account.
The obligations of a seller's agent are
also subject to any specific provisions set
forth in an agreement between the agent
and the seller.
In dealings with the buyer, a seller's
agent should (a) exercise reasonable skill
and care in performance of the agent's du-
ties; (b) deal honestly, fairly and in good
faith; and (c) disclose all facts known to
the agent materially affecting the value or
desirability of property, except as other-
wise provided by law.
BUYER'S OR TENANTS AGENT
If you are interested in buying or
leasing real property, you can engage a
real estate agent as a buyer's or tenant's
agent. A buyer's agent acts solely on be-
half of the buyer. You can authorize a
buyer's agent to do other things including
hire subagents, broker's agents or work
with other agents such as seller's agents
on a cooperative basis.
A buyer's agent has, without limita-
tion, the following fiduciary duties to the
buyer: reasonable care, undivided loyalty,
confidentiality, full disclosure, obedience
and a duty to account.
The obligations of a buyer's agent'are
also subject to any specific provisions set
forth in an agreement between the agent
and the buyer.
In dealings with the seller, a buyer's
agent should (a) exercise reasonable skill
and care in performance of the agent's du-
ties; (b) deal honestly, fairly and in good
faith; and (c) disclose all facts known to
the agent materially affecting the buyer's
ability and/or willingness to perform a
contract to acquire seller's property that
are not inconsistent with the agent's fidu-
ciary duties to the buyer.
BROKER'S AGENTS
As part of your negotiations with a
real estate agent, you may authorize your
agent to engage other agents whether you
are a buyer/tenant or seller/landlord. As a
general rule, those agents owe fiduciary
duties to your agent and to you. You are
not vicariously liable for their conduct.
AGENT REPRESENTING BOTH
SELLER AND BUYER
A real estate agent acting directly or
through an associated licensee, can be the
agent of both the seller/landlord and the
buyer/tenant in a transaction, but only
with the knowledge and informed consent,
in writing, of both the seller/landlord and
the buyer/tenant.
In such a dual agency situation, the
agent will not be able to provide the full
range of fiduciary duties to the buyer/ten-
ant and seller/landlord.
The obligations of an agent are also
subject to any specific provisions set forth
in an agreement between the agent and
the buyer/tenant and seller/landlord.
An agent acting as a dual agent must
explain carefully to both the buyer/tenant
and seller/landlord that the agent is act-
ing for the other party as well. The agent
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should also explain the possible effects of
dual representation, including that by
consenting to the dual agency relationship
the buyer/tenant and seller/landlord are
giving up their right to undivided loyalty.
A BUYER/TENANT OR SELLER/
LANDLORD SHOULD CAREFULLY
CONSIDER THE POSSIBLE





You should carefully read all agree-
ments to ensure that they adequately ex-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
PROSPECTIVE BUYER/TENANT
(1) I have received and read this
disclosure notice.
(2) I understand that a seller's/
landlord's agent, including a listing
agent, is the agent of the seller/landlord
exclusively, unless the seller/landlord
and buyer/tenant otherwise agree.
(3) I understand that subagents,
including subagents participating in a
multiple listing service, are agents of the
seller/landlord exclusively.
(4) I understand that I may engage
my own agent to be my buyer'sltenant's
broker.
(5) I understand that the agent






- an agent of the seller/landlord





press your understanding of the
transaction. A real estate agent is a per-
son qualified to advise about real estate.
If legal, tax or other advice is desired, con-
sult a competent professional in that field.
Throughout the transaction you may
receive more than one disclosure form.
The law requires each agent assisting in
the transaction to present you with this
disclosure form. You should read its con-
tents each time it is presented to you, con-
sidering the relationship between you and




(1) I have received and read this
disclosure notice.
(2) I understand that a seller's/
landlord's agent, including a listing
agent, is the agent of the seller/landlord
exclusively, unless the seller/landlord
and buyer/tenant otherwise agree.
(3) I understand that subagents,
including subagents participating in a
multiple listing service, are agents of the
seller/landlord exclusively.
(4) I understand that a buyer's/
tenant's agent is the agent of the buyer/
tenant exclusively.
(5) I understand that the agent






- my agent as a seller's/landlord's











(1) I have received and read this dis-
closure notice.
(2) I understand that a dual agent
will be working for both the seller/land-
lord and buyer/tenant.
(3) I understand that I may engage
my own agent as a seller's/landlord's
agent or a buyer's/tenant's agent.
(4) I understand that I am giving up
my right to the agent's undivided loyalty.
(5) I have carefully considered the
possible consequences of a dual agency
relationship.
(6) I understand that the agent
presenting this form to me,
(name of licensee)
(name of firm)
a dual agent working for both the buyer/
tenant and seller/landlord, acting as such
with the consent of both the buyer/tenant
and seller/landlord and following full dis-











PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT
(1) I have received, read and under-
stand this disclosure notice.




- an agent of the seller/landlord
- an agent of the buyer/tenant
_ a dual agent working for both the
buyer/tenant and seller/landlord, acting
as such with the consent of both buyer/
tenant and seller/landlord and following
full disclosure to the buyer/tenant and
seller/landlord.
I also understand that
of
(name of real estate licensee)
(name of firm)
(check applicable relationship)
- an agent of the seller/landlord
- an agent of the buyer/tenant
a dual agent working for both the
buyer/tenant and seller/landlord, acting
as such with the consent of both buyer/
tenant and seller/landlord and following










5. This section shall not apply to a
real estate licensee who works with a
buyer or a seller in accordance with terms
agreed to by the licensee and buyer or
seller and in a capacity other than as an
agent, as such term is defined in para-
graph a of subdivision one of this section.
6. Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to limit or alter the application of
the common law of agency with respect to
residential real estate transactions.
(name of real estate licensee)
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4. Oregon's Disclosure Form
696.830. Agency disclosure and
acknowledgment forms.
(1) The disclosure form required by
ORS 696.820 shall be printed or typed on




(As required by Oregon Revised Statutes
Chapter 696)
An agency relationship arises when-
ever two persons agree that one is to act
on behalf of the other and in accordance
with the other's directions. The creation
of an agency relationship imposes certain
legal duties on the agent.
Before a seller or a buyer enters into
a discussion with a real estate licensee re-
garding a real property transaction, the
seller and the buyer should each under-
stand what type of agency relationship or
representation the buyer and the seller
may have with each agent in that
transaction.
SELLER'S AGENT
An agent who acts under a listing
agreement with the seller acts as the
agent for the seller only. A seller's agent
has affirmative obligations (under ORS
696.805):
(1) To the seller: The fiduciary duties
of loyalty, obedience, disclosure, confiden-
tiality, reasonable care and diligence, and
accounting in dealings with the seller.(2) To the buyer and to the seller:
Honest dealing and disclosure.
BUYER'S AGENT
A real estate licensee other than the
seller's agent can agree with the buyer to
act as the agent for the buyer only. In this
situation, the buyer's agent is not repre-
senting the seller, even if the buyer's
agent is receiving compensation for serv-
ices rendered, either in full or in part,
from the seller or through the seller's
agent. A buyer's agent has the affirmative
obligations (under ORS 696.810):
(1) To the buyer: The fiduciary duties
of loyalty, obedience, disclosure, confiden-
tiality, reasonable care and diligence, and
accounting in dealings with the buyer.
(2) To the buyer and to the seller:
Honest dealing and disclosure.
SELLERS AND BUYERS
None of the foregoing duties of the
agent in a real estate transaction relieves
a seller or a buyer from the responsibility
to protect the seller's or buyer's own inter-
ests respectively. The seller and the
buyer should carefully read all agree-
ments to assure that the agreements ade-
quately express the seller's or the buyer's
understanding of the transaction.
THE ACTS OF THE AGENTS MAY
CAUSE LEGAL LIABILITY TO THE
PRINCIPALS. A REAL ESTATE
LICENSEE IS QUALIFIED TO ADVISE
ON REAL ESTATE; IF YOU DESIRE
LEGAL ADVICE, CONSULT A
LAWYER.
(2) The disclosure form required by ORS
696.820 shall be printed or typed on the





By my signature below, I acknowledge:
(1) I have received and read and I un-
derstand the material set out on the back
of this disclosure form.
(2) 1 understand that a seller's agent,
including a listing real estate licensee, is
the agent of the seller exclusively, unless
the seller and the buyer otherwise agree.
(3) I understand that, unless other-
wise disclosed in writing, all real estate
licensees including real estate licensees
participating in a multiple listing service
are agents of the seller exclusively.
(4) 1 understand that a buyer's agent
is the agent of the buyer exclusively.
(5) I understand that - (name of
licensee) of - (name of real estate or-
ganization), the agent presenting this




-my agent as a seller's agent.
_ an agent as buyer's agent.
(B) INITIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
PROSPECTIVE BUYER
By my signature below, I acknowledge:
(1) I have received and read and I un-
derstand the material set out on the back
of this disclosure form.
(2) 1 understand that a seller's agent,
including a listing agent, is the agent of
the seller exclusively, unless the seller
and the buyer otherwise agree.
(3) I understand that, unless other-
wise disclosed in writing, all real estate
licensees including real estate licensees
participating in a multiple listing service
are agents of the seller exclusively.
(4) I understand that I may engage
my own agent to be my buyer's agent.
(5) 1 understand that __ (name of
licensee) of___ (name of real estate or-
ganization), the agent presenting this
form to me, is (check applicable
relationship):
_ an agent of the seller.
-my agent as buyer's agent.
(C) SIGNATURES
Buyer/Seller: _ Dated: _
Buyer/Seller: _ Dated: _
Buyer/Seller: _ Dated: __
Buyer/Seller: _ Dated: __
Circle applicable title.
Agent to sign and date:
_ Real Estate Licensee
_ Real Estate Organization
(3) If the broker intends to offer "in-
company" representation to buyers and
sellers, then the disclosure form required
by ORS 696.820 shall be printed or typed
on the back of the form, in addition to the
disclosure required by subsection (1) of
this section, in substantially the following
form:
IN-COMPANY SALES
(1) A licensee, acting either alone or
through one or more licensees within the
same real estate organization, may give
limited representation to both the seller
and the buyer in a real estate transaction.
(2) In an in-company agreement, the
agent acting as an in-company agent has
the following affirmative obligations to
both the seller and the buyer:
(a) Loyalty, obedience, disclosure,
confidentiality and accounting in dealings
with both the seller and the buyer. HOW-
EVER, IN REPRESENTING BOTH THE
SELLER AND THE BUYER, THE LI-
CENSEE SHALL NOT, WITHOUT THE
EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION OF
THE RESPECTIVE PERSON, DIS-
CLOSE TO THE OTHER PERSON:
(i) That the seller will accept a price
lower than or terms less favorable than
the listing price or terms; or
(ii) That the buyer will pay a price
higher than or terms more favorable than
the offering price and terms; or
(iii) Other than price and terms, confi-
dential information specifically desig-
nated as such in writing by the buyer or
seller as set out on the front of this disclo-
sure form or attached to it.
(b) Reasonable care and diligence.
(c) Honest dealing.
(4) If the broker intends to offer "in-
company" representation to buyers and
sellers, then the disclosure form required
by ORS 696.820 shall be printed or typed
on the front of the form, in addition to the
disclosure required by subsection (2) of




By my initials below, I acknowledge:
(1) A situation may arise wherein the
licensee I have hired to be my agent may
also be the agent for the seller of specific
real property I wish to acquire.
(2) If this situation arises, I authorize
my agent to act as an in-company agent
for that specific real property after mak-
ing a reasonably diligent effort to contact
me in order to obtain my consent.
(3) I have read and understand the
"In-Company Sales" section on the reverse
side of this form.
(4) The following information, which
has previously been disclosed by the buyer
to the agent, is confidential and is not to







By my initials below, I acknowledge:
(1) A situation may arise wherein the
licensee I have hired to be my agent may
also be the agent for the buyer who wishes
to acquire my real property.
(2) If this situation arises, I authorize
my agent to act as an in-company agent
for that specific real property after mak-
ing a reasonably diligent effort to contact
me in order to obtain my consent.
(3) I have read and understand the
"In-Company Sales" section on the reverse
side of this form.
(4) The following information, which
has previously been disclosed by the seller
to the agent, is confidential and is not to




• Buyer/Seller: - Dated:
• Buyer/Seller: - Dated:
• Buyer/Seller: - Dated:
* Buyer/Seller: - Dated:
* Circle applicable title.
Agent to sign and date:
_ Real Estate Licensee
Real Estate Organization
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